Monday, November 16, 2026

⚡ Weekly Recap: N-able 0-Days, Windows 0-Days, Chrome 0-Days, Fridge 0-Days, and More Bad Days

A default password opened doors it never should have. A trusted update delivered malware. Even a security feature became a way to break in. Different stories, same problem: the things meant to protect us aren't always doing their job.

Meanwhile, AI is making bug hunting faster, old flaws are still paying off, and attackers keep finding easy ways in. Some attacks take real skill. Others barely need any.

This week's stories show both sides. Here's what happened.

⚡ Threat of the Week

N-able 0-Days Exploited for Dropping Crypto Miners — A new set of vulnerabilities tracked as 4EverAble2Shell has come under active exploitation, with attackers exploiting it to deploy cryptocurrency miners on vulnerable servers. According to Huntback, the activity has successfully compromised 21 N-central servers across the U.S., South Africa, Canada, the U.K., Germany, France, and Sweden. Patches for the flaw are expected to be released N-able today.

🔔 Top News

  • Compromised bee-js and Swarm Desktop Steal Swarm Wallet Keys — Threat actors compromised @ethersphere/bee-js, the JavaScript client for the Swarm storage network, with a new postinstall hook in version 13.3.0 that downloads a second stage responsible for stealing the Swarm node's wallet key and installing a backdoor. "On Linux and macOS, the backdoor is a Go remote shell," SafeDep said. "On Windows, it is a hidden ScreenConnect client that runs as SYSTEM." The same malicious code was subsequently distributed via Swarm Desktop 0.56.2 on GitHub. The activity has since been linked to a campaign called SleepyDuck (EtherDuck), which is known to spread malicious Solidity extensions through Open VSX. "The attacker controlled two Ethersphere GitHub accounts. GitHub activity logs attribute 13 pushes on November 6 to long-time maintainer nugaon," SafeDep added. "That day the attacker injected GitHub Actions workflows to steal CI credentials, and the attempts failed. Two days later, the attacker used the release bot bee-worker to publish the malicious releases. How the attacker got into either account remains unknown."
  • Nightmare Eclipse New SignDrop 0-Day — Security researcher Abdelhamid Naceri (aka Chaotic Eclipse) released a new Windows zero-day exploit that can let attackers gain SYSTEM privileges. Called SignDrop, it has been described as a Windows Common Log FileSystem (CLFS) authentication zero-day local privilege escalation flaw. "The vulnerability turns a defense into an attack surface," Cyderes said. "Microsoft added HMAC-based authentication codes to CLFS log files specifically to block the class of logic bugs caused by improper validation of CLFS data structures, which accounted for 19 of 24 CLFS CVEs over five years. SignDrop abuses the signing mechanism itself: it forces clfs.sys to create a .cnpf signature file as SYSTEM in an attacker-controlled location, producing a privileged file-creation primitive at an attacker-selected path. Because the resulting file retains attacker-accessible security attributes, the exploit reopens it and replaces the CLFS-generated content with an embedded payload DLL." Microsoft said it's investigating the reported vulnerability. In late September, the researcher also released an exploit for BigDiskBuster, a denial-of-service (DoS) flaw impacting Microsoft Defender that's similar to UnDefend and prevents the application from performing platform/signature updates.
  • Default Admin Password Lets Researchers Unlock and Start Cars — New research found that it's possible to take over customer accounts at two major automakers, and use them to remotely unlock and start a test car, flash headlights, and sound horns after finding an administration console on the brands' login servers still protected by its default password. Both apps signed customers in through ForgeRock, an identity platform now part of Ping Identity. The carmakers remediated the flaw approximately two hours after responsible disclosure.
  • Google Patches Actively Exploited Chrome 0-Day — Google released updates to patch a high-severity vulnerability in Chrome has come under active exploitation in the wild. The flaw, tracked as CVE identifier CVE-2026-125350 (CVSS score: 8.8), has been described as a use-after-free bug in the XML component. The issue has been addressed in 157.0.8103.50/.51 for Windows and Apple macOS, and 157.0.8103.50 for Linux. Google did not disclose how the vulnerability is being exploited and in what context.
  • Meta Fined by Italy Over Accessing Android Users' Photos with Facebook App — The Italian Data Protection Authority (IDPA) hit Meta with one of its highest fines to date. According to the Italian data regulatory body, Meta has been fined €805 million for failing to disclose that it had access to user photos, videos, and metadata for those using the Facebook app on Android devices. Meta had access to Android users' ​photos and videos through a Facebook app feature that ​suggested content from users' personal galleries that they ⁠could post. The feature has been available since 2023. Meta has 60 ​days to disable the feature by default and seek users' consent ​separately. The company said it would appeal the decision. "This is a simple feature ​that helps people share photos and videos on Facebook," Meta told Reuters. ​"Users must grant permission on their device before the feature can operate, and ‌they ⁠can change that permission at any time in their settings."

‎️‍🔥 Trending CVEs

Bugs drop weekly, and the gap between a patch and an exploit is shrinking fast. These are the heavy hitters for the week: high-severity, widely used, or already being poked at in the wild.

Check the list, patch what you have, and hit the ones marked urgent first — CVE-2026-121685, CVE-2026-121686, CVE-2026-121687, CVE-2026-121688, CVE-2026-121689, CVE-2026-121690 (FrodoBots EarthRover Mini+ firmware), CVE-2026-124916 (PrestaShop), CVE-2026-76964, CVE-2026-89126 (aka ICM2SHELL), CVE-2026-89103 (aka PROXYGATE), CVE-2026-120017 (SAP), CVE-2026-98432, CVE-2026-111497, CVE-2026-114406 (N-able N-Central), CVE-2026-111760, CVE-2026-113408, CVE-2026-114467, CVE-2026-114469, CVE-2026-105437, CVE-2026-114466 (Git), CVE-2026-121356, CVE-2026-121351, CVE-2026-121889, CVE-2026-121352, CVE-2026-121353, CVE-2026-121354, CVE-2026-121887, CVE-2026-121892, CVE-2026-121894, CVE-2026-121896, CVE-2026-121898, CVE-2026-121906, CVE-2026-121908, CVE-2026-121349, CVE-2026-121904, CVE-2026-121902, CVE-2026-121355, CVE-2026-104351, CVE-2026-104353, CVE-2026-105780, CVE-2026-105489, CVE-2026-105781, CVE-2026-104350, CVE-2026-104354, CVE-2026-105779, CVE-2026-114371, CVE-2026-113580, CVE-2026-113579, CVE-2026-119017 (Adobe), CVE-2026-109091, CVE-2026-109092, CVE-2026-109095, CVE-2026-109096, CVE-2026-109903, CVE-2026-109093, CVE-2026-109904, CVE-2026-109094 (X.Org X server and Xwayland), from CVE-2026-124852 through CVE-2026-124908 (Mozilla Firefox), CVE-2026-125350, CVE-2026-126885, CVE-2026-126895, CVE-2026-126879, CVE-2026-126846, CVE-2026-126911 (Google Chrome), CVE-2026-76463, CVE-2026-76464, CVE-2026-76467, CVE-2026-76468, CVE-2026-76469, CVE-2026-76470, CVE-2026-76472 (Cisco Meraki), CVE-2026-113968, CVE-2026-113969, CVE-2026-113964, CVE-2026-113965, CVE-2026-113970, CVE-2026-113961, CVE-2026-113960, CVE-2026-113963, CVE-2026-113971, CVE-2026-111497 (Apple), CVE-2026-125742 (7-Zip), CVE-2026-119948 (Microsoft Windows), CVE-2026-124194 (Microsoft Outlook), CVE-2026-68982 (Apache Airflow), CVE-2026-126170 (Fortinet FortiSASE-Sovereign, FortiAnalyzer, FortiManager, FortiAnalyzer Cloud, FortiManager Cloud, and FortiAnalyzer Big-Data GUI), CVE-2026-126253, CVE-2026-126254 (Fortinet FortiOS and FortiSASE), CVE-2026-126229 (Fortinet FortiManager, FortiAnalyzer, FortiManager Cloud, and FortiAnalyzer Cloud), CVE-2026-126261 (Fortinet FortiManager FGFM), CVE-2026-126262, CVE-2026-126260 (Fortinet FortiAnalyzer and FortiManager), CVE-2026-126259 (Fortinet FortiOS), CVE-2026-121683 (Ivanti Cloud Services Application), CVE-2026-105425 (Ivanti Sentry), CVE-2026-105425 (Ivanti EPMM), CVE-2026-121653 (Ivanti Endpoint Manager), CVE-2026-61887 (Intel), CVE-2024-36313, CVE-2026-40680 (AMD), CVE-2026-115338, CVE-2026-115341, CVE-2026-115339, CVE-2026-35189 (Progress WS_FTP Server), CVE-2026-63017, CVE-2026-63774 (Subnet Solutions PowerSYSTEM Center), CVE-2026-104269, CVE-2026-73857 (ModSecurity), CVE-2026-102705 (Citrix XenServer), CVE-2026-119618 (Apache HTTP Server), CVE-2026-118383 (MongoDB), CVE-2026-123863, CVE-2026-123866, CVE-2026-123865, CVE-2026-123874, CVE-2026-126051, CVE-2026-123872 (Node.js), CVE-2026-90436 (Apache Axis), CVE-2026-0330 (Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS), CVE-2026-123710 (Red Hat Quay), CVE-2026-120868, CVE-2026-107407, CVE-2026-107408, CVE-2026-107409, CVE-2026-107410, CVE-2026-107412, CVE-2026-107415, CVE-2026-111344, CVE-2026-120864, CVE-2026-120869 (Citrix), CVE-2026-6460, VE-2026-18447, CVE-2026-116304, CVE-2026-116306, CVE-2026-116309, CVE-2026-116314, CVE-2026-116315, CVE-2026-116316, CVE-2026-116317, CVE-2026-116318, CVE-2026-116319, CVE-2026-116320, CVE-2026-116323, CVE-2026-116326, CVE-2026-116328, CVE-2026-116329, CVE-2026-116330, CVE-2026-116331, CVE-2026-116332, CVE-2026-116335, CVE-2026-116336, CVE-2026-120139, CVE-2026-120141, CVE-2026-120142, CVE-2026-120143, CVE-2026-120144, CVE-2026-120145, CVE-2026-120147, CVE-2026-120149, CVE-2026-120150, CVE-2026-120151 (PostgreSQL), CVE-2026-128321 (TightVNC and UltraVNC Viewer), CVE-2026-127109 (PromZard), CVE-2026-123790 (ComfyUI-Easy-Use), CVE-2026-125926 (mcp-gateway-registry), CVE-2026-81936 (Lenovo ThinkSystem V4), CVE-2026-121144, CVE-2026-121145, CVE-2026-121146, CVE-2026-121147 (Tata Motors iRA 2.0 and iRA.ev), CVE-2026-99288 aka NoisyTCP (Linux kernel), and multiple arbitrary file read and write vulnerabilities in applications that use ImageMagick.

🎥 Cybersecurity Webinars

  • Your SOC Has an Identity Blind Spot — Here's How Attackers Exploit It and How to Close It → Your SOC may be tracking threats, but is it missing the identities behind them? As attackers increasingly exploit human, machine, and AI identities, traditional security tools often lack the context needed to detect and contain threats quickly. Join this free webinar to learn how connecting identity security with SOC operations can expose hidden risks, reveal attack blast radius, and accelerate incident response.
  • Your GitHub Actions May Still Be Vulnerable — Even With SHA Pinning. Here's Why → Think your GitHub Actions are secure because you use SHA pinning? Think again. Attackers can exploit hidden weaknesses in CI/CD workflows, even when standard security measures are in place. Join this expert-led webinar to discover how these attacks work, why SHA pinning alone isn't enough, and what you can do to protect your software supply chain.

📰 Around the Cyber World

  • A cybercrime investigation from independent cybersecurity journalist Brian Krebs has linked the administrator of Qilin ransomware to Aleksey Mikhailovich Yakovtsev, a 36-year-old man living in St. Petersburg, Russia.
  • The TOR project released 0.4.9.17 to include denial-of-service (DoS) defenses related to IPv6 handling. "This release comes in rapid response to the ongoing DDoS attack on the network, which has affected most relay operators," the maintainers said. "This is not an easy problem to address, as relays across the network are being overwhelmed by a massive flood of client circuits. We are actively evaluating additional defenses and so expect further releases in the near future."
  • As many as six pre-authentication remote code execution 0-day vulnerabilities have been uncovered in the Danfoss AK-SM 800A fridge controllers. The flaws, identified by Midnight Blue within the span of an hour, allow full device take-over, persistent access (possibly after reset), and persistent denial-of-service, rendering the device inoperable. Additional technical details are currently withheld. "Through remote code execution, an unauthenticated attacker can remotely run arbitrary code at the operating system level of the AK-SM800A controller," Midnight Blue said. "Due to the lack of secure boot, an attacker with RCE could push malicious firmware that simply renders the device inoperable and irrecoverable without specialized hardware intervention (e.g. by wiping flash memory and/or causing an infinite boot loop). Such a 'bricking' or wiper approach would require full device replacement." The findings unfold against the backdrop of two waves of cyber attacks targeting internet-exposed fridge controllers by Danfoss and Copeland across Europe.
  • Cruciferra has been revealed as a rebrand of the long-running KGB cryptor. It has been sold to cybercriminals since October 2025. ESET said it has prevented over 700,000 compromise attempts from Cruciferra since January 2026, most of them targeting Türkiye, Greece, and Spain. It has been used to deliver payloads like Formbook and PureLogs. "In mid-October the cryptor's domain was seized, and the service went dark," ESET said. "Days later, the same operator resurfaced with a new offering – exclusive $5K-per-build cryptors, pitched against enterprise EDRs and advertised with a claimed bundled kernel 0-day. Seized infrastructure ≠ a dead service."
  • Using AI models on a limited budget and running it against 10 popular TCP/IP stacks has led to the discovery of 99 vulnerabilities in 90 hours. Of these, 66 are new vulnerabilities, 52% of them critical or high severity. This also includes seven vulnerabilities specific to the firmware of a discontinued wireless access point, such as buffer overflow via firmware upload and hard-coded administrator credentials that cannot be changed for web and shell management. "AI cut the analysis time from 9 months to 90 hours and the research cost by 100x when compared to our previous analysis," Forescout said. "It rediscovered 40% of the vulnerabilities we had previously disclosed on those stacks. Total static analysis cost was $935, an average of $2.58 per finding."
  • Since 2021, Project Zero has followed a "90 + 30" vulnerability disclosure policy, allowing vendors up to 90 days to address a vulnerability, plus an extra 30 days "soak time" for patch rollout. That's changing now with the emergence of AI-assisted vulnerability discovery and exploitation. Going forward, Google Project Zero will disclose vulnerabilities 90 days after they are reported to the vendor, regardless of whether they are fixed. The deadline drops to 60 days on February 2, 2027, and to 30 days on January 3, 2028.
  • ClickFix-style lures are being used to deliver a macOS-focused, modular information stealer called Phexia. The malware is also capable of deploying an XMRig miner. "The most recent and notable change in Phexia occurred in May 2026, when the threat actor started testing smart contracts on the Polygon blockchain as a command-and-control (C2) dead-drop resolver (DDR)," WithSecure said. "The abuse of smart contracts by threat actors as part of their attack chain is generally known as EtherHiding. The malware previously relied on hardcoded C2 domains as well as Telegram channels and Steam profiles as its C2 DDR. The threat actor was observed actively weaponizing the Polygon smart contracts since late May to early June 2026."
  • The threat actors behind WeedHack have been linked to another cybercriminal operation called Marsalek that expands beyond using Minecraft lures to disguise malicious software as popular gaming tools, cheats, and utilities for games including Roblox, Fortnite, and Counter-Strike 2. "Active from approximately December 2025 through May 2026, Marsalek offered free access to sophisticated information-stealing malware through a publicly accessible platform, complete with a dashboard that allowed users to create malicious files, track victims, and access stolen information," McAfee Labs said. The cybersecurity company identified more than 1,560 registered accounts, over 400 malicious files, and more than 29 distribution URLs associated with the campaign. Marsalek also deploys a second information stealer called PureLog to steal sensitive data and exfiltrate it to another server. "This means that while someone using Marsalek may believe they're collecting stolen passwords and other personal information for themselves, the malware operator could also gain access to that information without their knowledge," McAfee Labs. This tactic is called double theft or a dual-hook infection.
  • New findings from SOCRadar show that ransomware operators have started handing the attack to AI agents, leading to the rise of agentic ransomware attacks. "Agentic ransomware is ransomware where AI agents do the hands-on work: choosing techniques, running tools and writing code, within limits a human sets," SOCRadar said. "In less than a year, AI agents moved from building access for ransomware brands to running live encryption and extortion campaigns."
  • An active campaign discovered in early October 2026 is targeting internet-facing Microsoft SQL Server instances and using Transact-SQL (T-SQL) commands to deliver malware such as XMRig miner and Gh0st RAT. The attacks employ predefined username and password lists to brute-force into the servers and exploit their administrative capabilities to execute commands on the underlying Windows systems. "The malware scans IP ranges for exposed SQL Servers and attempts to log in using supplied credentials," Fortinet said. "After a successful login, it remotely executes malicious T-SQL commands on the compromised server to download and run additional malware." It's not known how many servers were compromised or who was behind the campaign.
  • A Europol operation, in collaboration with law enforcement agencies from 14 countries across the globe, has successfully identified vendors and buyers from major dark marketplaces as part of Operation TorNado, a coordinated international effort targeting cybercrime, drug trafficking, and firearms offenses. "The operation, which spanned from May 2025 to October 2026, resulted in 354 arrests and hundreds of house searches worldwide," Europol said. "This effort included a follow-up action focused on the identification of suspects after the takedown of five major dark marketplaces: Archetyp, Bohemia, Nemesis, Kingdom, [and] Tor2Door." The U.S. led with 132 arrests, followed by the U.K. (59). Authorities also seized more than 5.7 metric tonnes of illicit drugs, 209 firearms, and over $234 million in both cash and virtual currencies.
  • Threat actors have been observed using a "convincing device-code phishing attack" that involves a Microsoft Teams calendar invite booking flow to target a company in the construction sector. The attack was observed in mid-October 2026. "While many device code phishing lures leverage a generic Microsoft sign-in form, this attack crafted an email with a believable social engineering lure that impersonated a legitimate senior vice president of another company in the construction sector, complete with a typosquatted email domain," Huntress said. "A link in the message to the victim began a 'Microsoft Teams Meeting Scheduler' booking flow, which included prompts to pick a duration of the call, as well as a date and a time. On the backend, these prompts kicked off the Microsoft device code sign-in process and returned a user code, and when the target clicked the 'Confirm Meeting' prompt on the lure page, they were unknowingly copying the code to their clipboard. Then a pop-up prompt opened to Microsoft's real device sign-in page, asking the target to submit the code, which completed the device-code phishing attempt."
  • Threat actors are probing two of 14 vulnerabilities newly disclosed in XWEB EVO, the Dixell refrigeration supervisor now sold under the Copeland name. According to VulnCheck, the flaws in question are CVE-2026-124014 (an unauthenticated write of the system configuration file via config.lua) and CVE-2026-124010 (an unauthenticated root command execution flaw). These two flaws, along with seven others, only affect firmware builds that predate a 2021 rewrite, while the remaining five also impact the latest firmware, 5.8.8, which has reached end-of-support and won't be patched.. As of March 2026, Copeland ended software support for the XWEB EVO family, and has advised customers to move to XWEB Pro models.
  • Microsoft has warned of a phishing campaign exploiting the widespread outage on November 12, 2026, that affected access to business email and other cloud services across multiple regions. "The messages impersonate Microsoft 365 service health notifications and reference the legitimate Exchange Online incident EX1550543," Microsoft said. "The activity is consistent with credential phishing, although credential collection and malware delivery have not been confirmed." The outage has since been attributed to a software defect introduced in a July 2026 update for network gateway servers.
  • Threat actors are exploiting unpatched GeoVision camera software to deploy an XMRig cryptocurrency miner across 13 organizations. "All malicious activity stemmed from GeoStartupAgentService.exe; across many endpoints, the activity was run under the NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM account," Huntress said, adding the bulk of the attacks occurred between November 8 and November 10, 2026. The attack employs the Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) technique to tamper with antivirus protections like Microsoft Defender by making use of "wsftprm.sys." Also deployed as part of the intrusion chain is a PowerShell script that drops a custom Golang loader that uses BitTorrent DHT and PKARR for C2 server discovery for added resilience and to make it possible to move to new infrastructure without losing access to the infected machines. In the final stage, the loader sets up a scheduled task to execute itself every 15 minutes and ultimately deploys the miner.

Conclusion

The strange part isn't how clever some of these attacks have become. It's how many still work because of things nobody checked, fixed, or thought twice about.

And with finding flaws getting cheaper and exploiting them getting easier, that gap is only becoming harder to ignore. Plenty to unpack this week.



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Give sandboxed agents live web access with the Firecrawl kit for Docker Sandboxes

Sandboxed agents cannot read the web

A coding agent in Docker Sandboxes runs inside an isolated VM, the sandbox controls which hosts it can reach, and credentials stay on the host behind a proxy. The same controls keep the agent from opening a docs page, reading a changelog, or looking up an API that shipped after its training cutoff, so it writes code against the version it remembers. The usual fix is to widen the allowlist until the agent can fetch anything, which hands back most of what the sandbox took away.

The Firecrawl kit gives the agent web search, page scraping, and site crawling through one added host, api.firecrawl.dev, and every page comes back as clean markdown.

In this post, you’ll learn:

  • How the Firecrawl sandbox kit plugs into a sandbox you already run
  • How to install the sandbox kit and give your agent its first live-web task
  • How to check that the SDK, the API key, and the network rule all work
  • What the sandbox kit can’t do yet, and what new work it makes possible for your agent

Why a kit

The Firecrawl kit is a mixin (kind: mixin): it extends whichever workload you already run rather than defining a new sandbox. Its descriptor, firecrawl/firecrawl.yaml, declares four typed capabilities:

  1. An install step (lifecycle@1). It installs the Firecrawl Python SDK, firecrawl-py, pinned to 4.44.0, as the agent user, and fails sandbox creation if the install or import check fails.
  2. A credential (credential@1). It requests a proxy-managed firecrawl API key. Inside the sandbox, FIRECRAWL_API_KEY holds the placeholder proxy-managed; the proxy swaps in the real key on requests to api.firecrawl.dev, so the key never enters the image or the sandbox.
  3. Network permissions (network-policy@1), split by phase. The install step may reach pypi.org and files.pythonhosted.org; at runtime the agent may reach api.firecrawl.dev.
  4. Agent instructions (agent-context@1). A context file tells the agent the capability exists, how to call it, and which limits come from the sandbox. The workload indexes it from its own AGENTS.md.

The kit adds to the sandbox’s allowlist and does not narrow it, so everything else is set by your global sbx policy. Docker’s balanced preset allows package registries, GitHub, and a curated list of vendor domains, and returns a 403 for general websites, including most documentation sites, so Firecrawl is the agent’s route to those. Under deny-all, it is the agent’s only web host.

Kits are experimental and in Early Access, so the kit format and sbx commands may change. The steps below are current for October 2026; the repository README carries the latest.

The workflow

Prerequisites

  • The sbx CLI, version 0.46 or later, signed in with sbx login. On macOS: brew trust docker/tap && brew install docker/tap/sbx. Docker Desktop is not required.
  • A global network policy, set once with sbx policy init balanced. Without it, no sandbox starts.
  • A Firecrawl API key (fc-...) from firecrawl.dev/app/api-keys.
  • A workload to add the kit to. This walkthrough uses Docker’s shell workload, docker/sbx-kit-shell, with the Claude Code mixin, docker/sbx-kit-claude-mixin. Other workloads and agent mixins are on Docker Hub.

Kit: docker.io/firecrawl/sbx-kit-firecrawl:1.0.0 on Docker Hub, for linux/amd64 and linux/arm64. Source: github.com/firecrawl/firecrawl-docker-sandbox.

1. Store the key once on the host. The command prompts for the key. Service secrets are global by default, so every sandbox that requests the firecrawl service can use it once you approve. The kit never sees the value; the proxy injects it at request time.

sbx secret set firecrawl
sbx secret ls

2. Start a sandbox with the kit. The kit is an ordinary OCI image with its descriptor in the manifest, so a version tag is all you need. Each --kit adds a mixin to the workload, and the trailing . mounts your project directory.

sbx run docker/sbx-kit-shell:1.0.0 \
  --kit docker/sbx-kit-claude-mixin:2.1.285 \
  --kit docker.io/firecrawl/sbx-kit-firecrawl:1.0.0 .

On the first run, sbx asks you to approve sending the firecrawl credential to api.firecrawl.dev. Accept the defaults. The credential is required: with no secret stored, sbx refuses to create the sandbox instead of letting the agent hit a 401 mid-task. A detached or CI run cannot answer the approval prompt, so approve interactively once or write the binding to ~/.config/sbx/credentials.yaml first.

3. Give the agent a task that needs the live web. Documentation sites are blocked under balanced, so this one has to go through Firecrawl.

Read <https://docs.pydantic.dev/latest/changelog/> and list what changed in the latest Pydantic release. Quote the page, don't answer from memory.

The kit’s instructions tell the agent to scrape blocked hosts through Firecrawl, so it calls fc.scrape(...) unprompted. Its response, trimmed:

The most recent release listed on the changelog is v2.13.4 (2026-05-06). I fetched the page live through Firecrawl.

Quoted from the page:
> ## v2.13.4 (2026-05-06)
> ### What's Changed
> #### Packaging
> - Bump libc from 0.2.155 to 0.2.185 by @Viicos in #13109
> - Adapt `pydantic-core` linker flags on macOS by @washingtoneg and @Viicos in #13147
> #### Fixes
> - Preserve `RootModel` core metadata by @Viicos in #13129

It's a small patch release with no new features.

4. Verify each layer. In the same session, ! runs shell commands inside the sandbox.

!python3 -c "import firecrawl, importlib.metadata as m; print('firecrawl-py', m.version('firecrawl-py'))"

Expected: firecrawl-py 4.44.0.

!env | grep FIRECRAWL_API_KEY

Expected: FIRECRAWL_API_KEY=proxy-managed. A real fc-... value here means the key came from somewhere other than the kit.

!python3 - <<'PY'
from firecrawl import Firecrawl
fc = Firecrawl()
doc = fc.scrape("<https://docs.pydantic.dev/latest/changelog/>", formats=["markdown"])
print(doc.markdown[:300])
PY

Expected: the page as markdown, starting with # Changelog and the latest version heading. The same URL returns a 403 to curl from inside the sandbox, so output here proves the SDK, the credential, and the network rule at once.

The kit also describes itself inside the sandbox. This prints the published descriptor, and the agent instructions sit next to it as firecrawl-context.md:

!cat /usr/share/sandbox/kit/firecrawl/kit.yaml

Running from source. To review or modify the kit before you run it, clone the repository and point --kit at the firecrawl/ directory; sbx builds source kits on demand:

git clone &lt;https://github.com/firecrawl/firecrawl-docker-sandbox.git&gt;
sbx run docker/sbx-kit-shell:1.0.0 --kit ./firecrawl-docker-sandbox/firecrawl .

Known limitations

  • Under balanced, general websites return a proxy 403 to curl, so a URL found in a scrape result has to be scraped through Firecrawl too.
  • Screenshot and other media formats return links on Firecrawl’s storage host, which the allowlist does not include, so those files cannot be downloaded inside the sandbox.
  • Under organization governance, managed policy overrides the kit’s allow rule, and scrapes fail with a proxy-side 403 until the organization allows api.firecrawl.dev.
  • An HTTP 402 means the Firecrawl account is out of credits; the agent is told to stop rather than retry.

What this unlocks

With the kit installed, the agent can look things up on the web while it works. The sandbox only needs to talk to one new address, api.firecrawl.dev, and Firecrawl fetches the pages for it. This matters because the default balanced policy blocks most documentation sites. Without the kit, you’d have to allow each site one by one, and every new site you allow makes the sandbox a little less locked down.

Without the kit, you had a choice to make. The default balanced policy blocks most documentation sites, so you could either leave the agent working from what it remembered, or allow sites one by one and loosen the sandbox a little each time. The kit avoids that choice. Your Firecrawl API key stays on your machine, behind the proxy, and the agent still reads the web as it is today. 

Here’s what the agent can do:

  • Code against the current API, not the remembered one. Before calling a library or SaaS API, the agent scrapes its reference page and changelog. It uses today’s parameter names and spots deprecations that shipped after its training cutoff.
  • Upgrade dependencies with the release notes in hand. Asked to bump a package, the agent reads the release notes for every version in between, lists the breaking changes, and edits the code to match before running the tests.
  • Load a vendor’s docs into context. For a new integration, the agent crawls the relevant section of the vendor’s docs and gets it back as markdown, so it can work from the whole guide rather than one page.
  • Research an error it can’t explain. When a build or test fails with an unfamiliar message, the agent searches for it, reads the matching GitHub issue or forum thread, and applies the documented fix or workaround.
  • Cite its sources. Because every answer comes from a fetched page, the agent can quote the text and link the URL it used, so you can check its work.

The result is fewer made-up APIs, fewer failed upgrades, and less time spent correcting an agent that was confidently out of date.

Where the kit comes from

The kit is published under the firecrawl organization on Docker Hub as firecrawl/sbx-kit-firecrawl, with source, changelog, and CI on GitHub under Apache-2.0. The SDK pin is verified against PyPI’s package hashes at install time, and every release passes Docker’s kit-tck conformance suite in CI. Review the descriptor and allowlist before running it, as with any kit.

Try it

Pull the kit from Docker Hub: hub.docker.com/r/firecrawl/sbx-kit-firecrawl. Issues and feature requests go to the GitHub repository.



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Six Unpatched Danfoss Refrigeration Controller Flaws Could Allow Remote Takeover Without Login

Six flaws in Danfoss AK-SM800A refrigeration controllers could let a remote attacker take over a controller without logging in, Dutch security consultancy Midnight Blue said earlier this week.

No patch is available, and the researchers say the newest firmware, version 5.4.0, does not fix the flaws.

Government cybersecurity agencies in Belgium, Ireland and Germany told operators this week to take the controllers' management interfaces off the internet.

For a controller left on the internet, updating the firmware, changing default passwords or turning on Strict mode is not enough on its own, the Belgian and Irish agencies said. Strict mode is a login protection that requires encrypted connections and session tokens, but one of the six flaws is in the gateway that enforces it.

The AK-SM800A runs a store's fridges and freezers, and maintenance firms can manage it remotely. Such controllers were targeted in attacks in France starting October 11, and in a second wave across Europe that began last week. The attacks caused unwanted defrost cycles and destroyed stock.

Germany's federal IT security agency, the BSI, says in a security notice that the AK-SM800A was involved in earlier incidents in which refrigeration units in several countries were tampered with.

The agency has no information about any exploitation of the six new flaws, and neither other agencies nor researchers link the flaws to those incidents.

The researchers examined firmware version 5.3.2, then the newest, and say every version up to and including it is affected.

No CVE identifiers have been assigned. The researchers are keeping technical details private while they work on disclosure with Danfoss, the Danish company that makes the controllers.

The vendor lists software package 5.4.0, dated November, as its newest release for the AK-SM800A. Its 5.4.0 readme and November update guide cover upgrade steps, and the guide adds a stricter password rule. Neither mentions a fix for any vulnerability.

In a follow-up statement carried by trade publication Cooling Post, the researchers said 5.4.0 does not patch the flaws: "It's not really possible either because according to the file timestamp this firmware was likely built on October 29, before the second wave of cyber attacks and well before our vulnerability reports."

The German agency first said in a press release this week that 5.4.0 was not affected. Later the same day, it changed that in a corrected statement: it cannot rule out for now that 5.4.0 is affected.

The vendor's advisory page lists no advisory for the six flaws as of today, and no date for a fix has been published.

Midnight Blue researcher Carlo Meijer found the six flaws in less than an hour of manual review, using firmware the vendor offers for download, and described them in a technical write-up.

Five of the flaws are in web request handlers that do not require a login, inside a program that runs as root. Through one of them, the researchers ran code as root on older firmware, version 3.3.0, and they found the same bugs in 5.3.2.

Strict mode closes almost all of the controller's web attack surface to users who have not logged in, including the flaw used in that demonstration. The sixth flaw is in the gateway that enforces Strict mode, a separate program that blocks every request except the login until a user has logged in.

When the researchers ran firmware 5.3.2 in an emulator with Strict mode on, that flaw crashed the gateway. The crash could be turned into code execution with more work, the researchers say, and the gateway lacks basic exploit defenses such as stack canaries.

With code running as root, an attacker could change the controller's settings, start defrost cycles and hide that activity from its logs.

The controllers do not use secure boot, the researchers found, so an attacker could plant code that survives a factory reset and a firmware update. An attacker could also make a controller unusable until it is replaced.

The researchers say the code almost certainly holds more flaws like these, and they call patching flaws one by one or turning on Strict mode "a misallocation of scarce security and personnel resources."

What Operators Can Do

Removing internet exposure must not wait for a patch, and it is needed even where firmware is current and Strict mode is on, the Centre for Cybersecurity Belgium says.

The Belgian advisory and a similar Irish advisory recommend these steps:

  • Find every controller whose management interface can be reached from the internet, including through a 4G or 5G modem, and remove that exposure.
  • Give remote access only through a secure VPN or a protected internal network. Allowing only a service company's IP addresses through a firewall is a short-term measure.
  • Check temperature setpoints, defrost schedules, alarm settings, user accounts and remote-access settings for changes you did not make.

The German agency adds that anyone who suspects a compromise should change all credentials and check that equipment connected to the controller works properly.

Before cutting off the data a controller sends to its refrigeration service company, operators should check contract and insurance terms, the Belgian advisory says. They should also set up protected remote access so that monitoring can continue.

Danfoss's own update guide says the AK-SM800A should not be directly reachable from the public internet, adding: “This recommendation applies to all software versions, including those with Strict Mode enabled.”

Ireland's National Cyber Security Centre also advises running the latest supported firmware, changing default passwords and turning on Strict mode, but says operators should not rely on those steps alone.

Danfoss told Cooling Post on October 12 that most units hit in France were either older models that no longer receive updates or current AK-SM800A units running outdated firmware.

The vendor fixed earlier flaws in the AK-SM800A in 2023 and 2025, including login bypass and command injection bugs. Version 5.3.2, which the researchers examined, is newer than all of those fixes.



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Retadup Worm Resurfaces 7 Years After Takedown to Spread CoffeeLoader Malware

Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed details of a new variant of CoffeeLoader, a malware designed to deliver additional payloads to infected machines.

"On launch, the NSIS-based installer executable dropped a file named '7z.dll' into a temporary directory and ran it through rundll32.exe," Kaspersky said in an analysis published today.

"The '7z.dll' file was a patched version of the original library of the popular 7-Zip archiver. Part of its code had been replaced with malicious self-decrypting shellcode that turned out to be a new version of the Armoury packer."

CoffeeLoader was first documented by Zscaler ThreatLabz in March 2025, detailing its use of the Armoury packer to resist analysis and ultimately run Rhadamanthys shellcode. The malware is assessed to share source code similarities with another loader family tracked as SmokeLoader.

Malware packed with Armory uses file names like "ArmouryAIOSDK.dll" and "ArmouryA.dll," with the packer hijacking some of the original Armoury Crate functionality with self-decrypting shellcode.

Notably, the shellcode extracts code that executes a decryption routine on a system's GPU by making use of the OpenCL library. The end goal is to install CoffeeLoader, establish persistence, and execute it by injecting it into a newly created "dllhost.exe" process.

The latest version of the packer continues to use the GPU, but replaces OpenCL with the OpenGL library. In addition, the new version of the packer delivers intermediate shellcode instead of a DLL. This shellcode serves as a downloader responsible for fetching the main CoffeeLoader malware.

"To establish persistence, the Trojan copies '7z.dll' to subfolders of %PROGRAMDATA% or %LOCALAPPDATA%," Kaspersky said. "The Run registry key is used for autorun. The subfolder, library, and registry value are named with eight hexadecimal digits generated from system volume information."

"To protect itself, the downloader creates a registry key that prevents the user from disabling autorun through Task Manager."

Once persistence is successful, the malware launches one of the legitimate processes (e.g., "dllhost.exe," "WerFault.exe," "svchost.exe," "OpenWith.exe," or "AtBroker.exe") and then injects itself into it, after which the malware shellcode is downloaded from a hard-coded command-and-control (C2) server.

The shellcode then decrypts and runs the CoffeeLoader payload. It supports the same three commands to run the next-stage malware from the C2 server -

  • Injecting it into a process
  • Saving it to disk as an executable and then running it
  • Saving it as a DLL and then running it via "rundll32.exe"

As for how CoffeeLoader is distributed, it takes place via Retadup, a Windows computer worm that was disrupted by French law enforcement authorities in August 2019. The malware, which spreads via infected USB drives, has been used to drop additional payloads like cryptocurrency miners, the Stop ransomware, and the Arkei password stealer.

"Two years ago, someone began re-registering the domain names that Retadup had used as C2 servers and using them to issue commands to download third-party malware," Kaspersky said. "At first, this was the SmokeLoader downloader packed using the 32-bit version of Armoury, but in early 2025, the same servers started serving CoffeeLoader."

It remains unclear whether the worm's author or some other threat actor was instrumental in bringing the C2 servers back online. Kaspersky said it blocked around 15,000 systems from being infected with the resurrected version of the worm, most of them located in Peru, Angola, Russia, and Bolivia.



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SANSAR Linux Cryptomining Malware Uses Modified NVIDIA Library to Hide GPU Activity

A financially motivated threat activity cluster tracked as REF3364 has been attributed to a Linux-focused cryptocurrency mining operation that tampers with the readings used to detect high GPU workloads.

Central to the intrusion is a toolkit called SANSAR, a Rust-based orchestrator that receives commands over the TOR anonymity network to manage CPU and GPU miners. The activity was observed in late October 2026.

"The threat actor also deployed a kernel rootkit to hide selected processes and files, an NVIDIA Management Library (NVML) wrapper to falsify GPU readings, and a separate backdoor named netns," Elastic Security Labs said in a report published last week.

"This backdoor retrieves its C2 [command-and-control] address from an Ethereum smart contract before connecting to the server directly."

In the attack chain documented by the company, initial access is said to have been achieved via an exposed Ray job agent, allowing the threat actor to execute commands. This includes jobs running the NVIDIA System Management Interface (nvidia-smi) to capture and exfiltrate the GPU inventory to an external server.

Subsequently, the attacker submitted a Python reverse shell job that connected to a remote listener, after which an SSH key was added to that account's authorized_keys file to establish persistent access.

"After obtaining root, the actor staged the toolkit under /opt/vadi_, built the acpi_thermal_mgr kernel module through Dynamic Kernel Module Support (DKMS) and added an initramfs loader," security researcher Salim Bitam said.

"An initramfs is a temporary root file system loaded into RAM during early boot, before Linux switches to its normal root filesystem. The module and loader are stored in the boot image on disk, so the rootkit can load again when the host boots with that image."

The installation also delivers a modified NVML wrapper that filters process information and changes GPU telemetry to evade detection. Specifically, the altered wrapper hooks NVML calls used by monitoring tools such as nvidia-smi to report GPU utilization as 0%. In addition, temperature and power readings are substituted with random values between 36 to 46 degree Celsius (96.8 to 114.8 degree Fahrenheit) and 100 to 200 watts.

Also delivered are the following payloads -

  • sansar, used for TOR C2, launching or stopping the miner, miner configuration updates, connection management, spawning interactive shells, launching an IPv4 TCP SYN traffic task against a specified address and port, and NVML-hook maintenance
  • kurt (XMRig version 6.25.0), the miner selected by sansar's CPU branch
  • tilki (SRBMiner-MULTI version 3.6.9), the miner selected by sansar's GPU branch
  • lyrebird, a legitimate pluggable transport proxy for TOR
  • acpi_thermal_mgr.ko, a Linux rootkit used for process, directory, and socket-list concealment
  • netns, an Ethereum-assisted backdoor

Once launched, SANSAR first performs an anti-debugging check by reading the value of TracerPid and exits if it's non-zero. TracerPid indicates the Process ID (PID) of the process currently tracing or debugging the target process.

It then reaches out to an onion service ("efxisnqldelyr5ra25oqfrsut54b34g26e7zrsiuupsoekjof2gho2id[.]onion") for C2 communication via Arti, receiving commands, collecting host and GPU information, and fetching the miner status. The main responsibility of SANSAR is to supervise the mining process and launch the appropriate miner executable based on the miner type (i.e., CPU or GPU) specified in the C2 response message.

The "acpi_thermal_mgr.ko" kernel rootkit, on the other hand, uses Function Tracer (ftrace) to conceal cryptomining activity on Linux systems by hiding processes, files, and socket entries.

It achieves this by intercepting system calls to directory listings, file access, and process termination signals, removing matching records or blocking requests for those hidden processes and files by returning the message "No such file or directory" or "No such process."

The other main component of the operation is the netns backdoor that's registered as a systemd service. It's used to retrieve a controller IPv4 address by sending requests to an embedded contract (0x43eb291f56688c63c93e8a93c4591fc997cf6349) and then sets up a plain TCP connection to that address on port 8080 to open a reverse-shell connection to the specified host and port in the C2 response.

It's not clear who is behind the operation, but Elastic said it found Turkish language comments in the rootkit's source code.

"Organizations expanding GPU infrastructure for AI and LLM workloads should check who can submit jobs and whether GPU monitoring libraries have been modified, as cryptojacking can divert compute capacity from legitimate workloads and increase operating costs," Elastic said.



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BO Team Exploits Log4Shell in VMware vCenter, Compromises Russian Firm's Code-Signing Server

An investigation into suspicious activity within a Russian software developer's network has uncovered a months-long compromise of its development infrastructure and a software code-signing server.

The activity, documented by Kaspersky's ICS CERT team after it was contacted by the affected developer in June 2025, has been attributed to a threat actor named BO Team (aka Black Owl, Hoody Hyena, and Lifting Zmiy). The name of the targeted company was not disclosed, but it operates from within Russia and develops software that has a "customer base in the Russian Federation," according to Kaspersky.

Over the course of several months, the intrusion resulted in the theft of confidential information and the compromise of all components of the organization's IT infrastructure, including Windows and Linux servers, workstations, hypervisors, backup servers, security solution management servers, and network equipment.

Active since at least 2023, BO Team focuses on cyber espionage and hacktivism, and has a history of targeting Russian entities to steal valuable data and break into compromised infrastructure using tools like Mythic and Cobalt Strike, along with its own malware such as BrockenDoor and ZeronetKit. The group is assessed to be of Ukrainian origin.

"Their primary motivation is to degrade the Russian military-industrial complex to weaken Moscow's operational capabilities on the battlefield," Orange Cyberdefense said in an analysis of the group. "They also engage in cognitive warfare aimed at humiliating Russian institutions and demonstrating their vulnerability to Ukrainian digital resistance."

While BO Team is known to deploy ransomware and publicize its activities on a dedicated Telegram channel, the attack targeting the unspecified software developer did not involve any data destruction or public posts claiming responsibility for it.

"Instead, the attackers worked to entrench themselves in the victim's network by setting up convenient command channels and planting backdoors to restore access in case it was lost," Kaspersky said. "The compromise of the software development (CI/CD) infrastructure and the software code-signing server indicated that the attack would likely develop into a supply chain scenario."

The attack, per the Russian cybersecurity company, involved the threat actors compromising the organization's Linux terminal server by taking advantage of an exposed SSH service, and using it to conduct reconnaissance of the internal network to flag systems with accessible SMB, Kerberos, SSH, Telnet, FTP, HTTP, HTTPS, WinRM, and LDAP services.

The adversary has also been found unsuccessfully attempting to access internal portals, along with websites like proxy-sale[.]com, start.duckduckgo[.]com, vcsa.vmware[.]com, and vulners[.]com, among others.

Event logs show that the attackers further attempted to connect from the compromised terminal server to the virtualization system servers, including logging in to the VMware vCenter web interface. These sign-in efforts ended in failure.

However, the threat actor managed to successfully target a VMware vCenter server (version 7.0.3) vulnerable to CVE-2021-44228 (aka Log4Shell and LogJam), obtain a remote command line with root privileges, connect to the hypervisor over SSH, and identify accessible hosts.

This phase also involved the deployment of a backdoor on the hypervisor that was run every hour by planting a shell script in the "/etc/cron.hourly/" directory. The script carried the name "pgcache" in a likely attempt to disguise it as a legitimate PostgreSQL component.

The primary responsibility of the backdoor is to download and run a secondary shell script from "lo1yaizaeghaevarooD1ahtaichootae.nofrillsdns[.]com." The shell script is designed to download and run the Global Socket (GSocket) utility, enabling the attacker to gain remote control of the compromised host.

Select variants of the script have been found to point to a hostname-specific payload staged on "lo1yaizaeghaevarood1ahtaichootaz.nofrillsdns[.]com" to deliver an as-yet-undetermined next-stage payload.

"The attackers used the nofrillsdns[.]com service, which allows domain names to be created for free by calling the curl utility," Kaspersky said. "By default, when the malware's command-and-control server is not operating, the attackers set the corresponding DNS record to 127.0.0.1, which is what the script checks. Activating the backdoor requires only a change to the DNS record -- the script will then download and run the malware."

Some of the other post-exploitation actions undertaken by the BO Team following the backdoor deployment are listed below -

  • Gaining access to the corporate proxy server.
  • Abusing the certificate of the compromised hypervisor to connect to servers associated with a second virtualization cluster and place a similar backdoor.
  • Collecting information about virtual machines and firewall rules, accessing some of them via a command-line interpreter in the guest OS from the hypervisor.
  • Running an obfuscated bash script to decrypt and run an ELF binary designed to provide remote control over SSH.
  • Searching for secrets on the compromised virtual machines, allowing the attackers to breach the virtual machine of the GitLab software development platform, as well as gain access to some of the repositories containing source code and seize the server's private key.
  • Using the private key of the GitLab virtual machine to connect to the organization's Ansible orchestration system.
  • Using access to the Linux terminal server to locate credentials of several domain accounts and connect to the domain controller using the account of one of the system administrators after likely accessing the memory of virtual machines running on the compromised hypervisors.
  • Changing the security attributes of the user's Windows Downloads directory.
  • Using legitimate binaries like tasklist.exe, findstr.exe, taskmgr.exe, and ipconfig.exe to identify which security solutions were running on the system and to gather details about network interfaces.
  • Attempting to take a dump of the lsass.exe process using the Nanodump utility and obtain the credentials of domain administrators and other privileged users with access to the domain controller. The attackers deleted the event logs after the activity was detected and blocked by a security solution.
  • Using system utilities such as comsvcs.dll rather than established utilities like Mimikatz and Nanodump to create a memory dump of the lsass.exe process.
  • Dumping the system registry using the regedit.exe utility, and using it to decrypt the Active Directory domain database ("ntds.dit") to extract the credentials of all domain users.
  • Launching the OpenSSH scp.exe utility to transfer the collected information to the terminal server.
  • Logging in to the domain controller using the Kerberos ticket of one of the domain administrators and ultimately compromising the organization's entire Windows infrastructure by taking advantage of the fact that the same password was used for system administrator accounts in different domains.
  • Connecting to the terminal server over SSH using root account credentials after possibly stealing them from a system administrator's computer post obtaining domain administrator privileges.
  • Modifying "/usr/bin/nxnode-login" to intercept and write user credentials to a shared-memory file at "/dev/shm/pulse-shm-3088612174."
  • Successfully brute-forcing the password of the administrator's terminal server after about 2,500 failed attempts to place the private key of the Ansible system.
  • Complicating detection efforts by timestomping, obfuscation of malware code, usage of living-off-the-land (LotL) techniques, systematic deletion of event logs, and dressing up malware files as legitimate software.

"We found numerous traces of BO Team connecting to various Windows servers, though the attackers only used malware in one case," Kaspersky explained. "The server which apparently held particular interest for hackers, was used to sign compiled builds of the commercial software developed by the attacked organization."

"Attackers may be interested in such a server for two reasons. First, they may try to carry out a supply chain attack by injecting malicious code into a product build right before it is signed. Second, the attackers may try to steal the organization's digital signature to use later to sign malware."

It's suspected that the attackers likely attempted to execute a malicious WMI script and install a backdoor similar to the Linux variant in the temporary files directory.

But after the incident was detected and countermeasures were enacted, the attackers, after having lost access to the compromised infrastructure, orchestrated a phishing campaign towards the end of July in an attempt to collect employee credentials. The phishing email contained the "Account disconnected from the mail server" subject line and sought to trick the recipient into clicking on a link to change their password.

What's more, the email managed to bypass SPF and DKIM checks, indicating the attackers had in their possession a private key that was obtained after gaining control of the organization's mail server. The phishing attack was detected and prevented.

"The attackers used a service that automatically generates phishing pages," Kaspersky said. "The service loads the content of a targeted organization's official website and displays a password entry form on top of the official site's layout. After entering the password, the user sees an error message. However, the information is actually sent to the attacker."

"We repeatedly noted that the attackers tried not to use malware and hacking utilities in order to evade detection," Kaspersky said. "Instead, they actively used system tools such as RDP, SSH, and SCP, as well as system utilities to steal user credentials. This enabled them to develop the attack using legitimate accounts, which also matches the BO Team profile."

The activity has been found to originate from IP addresses 193.3.23[.]236 and 80.76.42[.]139, both of which belong to a provider in Ukraine. Further analysis into the malicious activity has revealed that the attackers followed a standard work schedule and operated in a time zone that differed "only slightly" from that of the victim Russian entity.

"Based on the totality of the circumstantial evidence, such as the attackers' interest in the source code repository and software build signing server, as well as their use of a software composition analysis (dependency analysis) platform, we believe that BO Team may have set out to inject malicious code into a solution released by the attacked organization in order to subsequently compromise its customers, i.e., carry out a so-called supply chain attack," Kaspersky concluded.

"Thanks to the rapid response measures applied after the incident was discovered, the attackers lost access to the compromised infrastructure and were apparently unable to bring the attack to its intended conclusion."



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Sunday, November 15, 2026

Italy Fines Meta €805 Million Over Facebook's Android Gallery Access Without Explicit Consent

Meta was fined €805 million in Italy yesterday over a Facebook for Android feature that suggests photos and videos from users' phone galleries for them to post.

The Garante, Italy's data protection authority, found that the feature was enabled by default and that the app accessed Italian users' photos, videos, and related metadata without their explicit consent.

The company has 60 days to switch the feature off by default, including for people who have already granted the app gallery access, and to request consent separately.

Meta plans to appeal and calls the fine "disproportionate", a spokesperson said in a statement reported by Reuters.

The app asks for gallery access via a single permission that covers the whole app and several functions with different purposes, the authority found. A general notice about enabling other features appears first, but it does not make it clear to users that they are also enabling gallery suggestions.

Fully granted, a permission like this lets the app read the phone's whole photo archive, usually on an ongoing basis. Neither the user nor the authority can check which information is actually used.

The authority found a breach of Article 122 of Italy's Privacy Code, which puts the EU's ePrivacy Directive into Italian law. That rule treats a phone as part of a person's private life. Any access to what the phone stores, therefore, requires free and informed consent, whether or not data is sent anywhere or harm results.

The authority's order, set out in its press release, requires the company to:

  • Within 60 days, ask for consent through a separate, specific request for this feature, and explain clearly what the feature is for, that it accesses the gallery, and how to turn it off.
  • Within 60 days, keep the feature off by default, including for people who already granted the permission.
  • Within 30 days, report to the authority on the work it has started, and within 90 days, on the measures it has taken.

If the company misses the 60-day deadline, the feature cannot be switched on for anyone who has not given valid consent.

Meta said in a statement quoted in a Reuters report that the feature works only after users give permission on their device, and that they can change that permission at any time in their settings.

The Centro Tutela Consumatori Utenti, the Bolzano consumer protection group whose complaint started the investigation, published consumer advice on July 11, 2025. It told users to switch off the gallery suggestion settings in the app and to check what access and permissions the Facebook app has on their phone.

The investigation did not look at whether gallery content was used to train AI models. The company denies any such use. The authority may separately examine a newer feature, launched this year, that allows gallery content to be processed in the cloud.

The company had argued that Ireland's data protection authority should handle the case. The Garante rejected that argument because the ePrivacy rules do not provide a one-stop-shop mechanism.

The feature has been available since 2023. The investigation began in July 2025 and included the authority's own technical analysis.

The fine equals about 0.47% of the group's global revenue. In setting it, the authority weighed the large number of people involved, about 20 million Android users in Italy.

It also weighed how long the breach has lasted. The breach is still ongoing for people who have not updated the app, and for those who have already granted permission, the authority said.

Other factors were a 2019 decision against the company and limited cooperation during the investigation. Changes the company made after the complaint counted in its favor, though the authority judged them late and limited to people who update the app.



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Stolen Fireworks AI Key Led to Cursor Data Breach and Trojanized Claude Code Extension

The compromise of Anthropic's official Claude Code extension on Cursor's extension marketplace was the result of the theft of an access key that was exposed in the wake of a breach targeting Fireworks AI.

"An attacker obtained an access key we had issued to Fireworks," Cursor said in a Friday update. "The key was exposed by Fireworks, and the attacker used it to copy data from a read-only storage bucket we used to share data with them."

The disclosure comes nearly two weeks after a trojanized version of Anthropic's official Claude Code extension was distributed through Cursor Marketplace as a legitimate update, attempting to install a persistent SSH backdoor on affected systems.

According to the artificial intelligence (AI)-powered coding platform, the read-only storage bucket is said to have contained limited coding agent traces from sessions that were not in Privacy Mode. Privacy Mode is a Cursor-specific setting that, if enabled, allows users to opt out of their data being used for training purposes.

These sessions, most of which date back to 2025, were permitted to be used for model training. Among these traces were credentials that had not been edited out, exposing the API credentials of less than 0.01% of customers in the process.

The attacker, Cursor added, used these credentials as a starting point to reach select software-as-a-service (SaaS) tools used by Cursor and then access the following data -

  • Select archived non-production Cursor source code repositories, including some containing business contact information
  • Limited customer support data and email conversations
  • Product usage metrics and contact details
  • Summaries of some coding agent conversations
  • Some credentials users had sent to the Cursor support team

Cursor said it took steps to deactivate the vendor's key, revoke and rotate credentials, and hunt for signs of deeper access, and contain it after "we identified further access." The company also said it temporarily disabled internal and product services, disrupting access to some Cursor features.

The next phase of the attack took place on October 29, 2026, when the attacker used a stolen credential from the exposed data of its internal system to place trojanized versions of Anthropic's Claude Code extension directly on the cache used to serve Cursor's extension marketplace.

"At most 5,000 users who requested specific cached versions of the extension on October 29 potentially received the malicious build," Cursor said. "It was available for approximately 11 hours before we removed it. We took it down, took the extension marketplace offline, and worked with the cloud service provider hosting the attacker's server to take it down."

The company said it notified affected users who installed versions 2.1.312 or 2.1.313 from the marketplace during the exposure window and helped revoke exposed credentials. It has also moved all inference traffic off Fireworks, deactivated the key issued to it, and cut off its access to all data sets we shared with it.

Furthermore, Cursor emphasized that no additional malicious activity has been detected since November 1, 2026.

There is no evidence that the incident impacted users who had enabled Privacy Mode, customer code repositories, Cursor's own production environment, Cursor app and its official updates, its other apps, or any other extension or plugin downloaded from Cursor Marketplace.

Uber Also Impacted by Fireworks Incident

The development comes as Uber confirmed unknown threat actors stole thousands of drivers' license information after obtaining internal credentials.

"On October 9, 2026, a service provider notified Uber that an unauthorized third-party had compromised the service provider's internal credentials and used them to access Uber's account with the service provider," the company said in a filing with the U.S. state of California. "On October 13, 2026, our investigation determined that the unauthorized party had used the compromised credentials to access Uber data connected to the service provider."

Although the name of the provider was not disclosed, TechCrunch reported that the provider in question is Fireworks AI. Uber has not disclosed how many users were impacted by the breach. Last week, online productivity startup Notion also confirmed its data was stolen in the Fireworks AI hack.



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AI News - Mid-November 2026

Brian and Brandon discuss the stunning resignation of NVIDIA CEO Jensen Huang, a story big enough to push election results, Anthropic’s IPO news, and a week of earnings off the agenda. They walk through what has been reported so far: relationships, including one with an executive tied to Megaspeed, a Southeast Asian cloud provider alleged to have funneled NVIDIA GPUs into China, and claims that security staff asked someone who photographed Huang to sign an NDA. Brandon cites Georgia coach Kirby Smart’s “dogs don’t beat dogs” to argue that CEOs have to follow their own company’s policies before anything else matters. To succeed interim CEO Colette Kress, Brian floats Tim Cook, Lisa Su, and Andy Jassy, while Brandon adds Lip-Bu Tan and Rene Haas and suggests NVIDIA may need a team of fixers to restructure Huang’s 60 direct reports. They debate whether extreme wealth breaks a leader’s judgment, and why success makes people afraid to call unusual practices strange. Brandon predicts NVIDIA will be fine because product-market fit covers a lot of mistakes, though AMD and Google’s TPUs get an opening. Brian warns that proven export violations could bring felony charges, large fines, and restated numbers. They close on who leaked the story and why now, with Brian suspecting that the US intelligence and military community saw a political window open after the midterms.

 

 

SHOW: 1080

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Saturday, November 14, 2026

Attackers Exploit UnrealIRCd Flaw That Enables Server-Level Command Injection

The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) on Friday added a high-severity security flaw impacting UnrealIRCd, an open-source Internet Relay Chat (IRC) server, to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, following reports of active exploitation.

The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-114713 (CVSS score: 8.6), is a case of improper neutralization of delimiters that could be used to execute arbitrary commands with server/IRCOp privileges.

"The labeled-response module in UnrealIRCd 6.0.0 before 6.2.7.1 does not escape the IRCv3 'label' message tag when echoing it into replies, which allows any user on a network with two or more linked servers to inject server-to-server commands that are executed with server authority," reads the description of the flaw in the NIST National Vulnerability Database (NVD).

The addition comes nearly a week after UnrealIRCd's project leader, developer, and maintainer, Bram Matthys (aka Syzop), released UnrealIRCd 6.2.7.1 to address multiple security vulnerabilities identified with the help of artificial intelligence, including CVE-2026-114713.

"We are seeing bad guys exploiting this issue on the internet right now," Matthys said. "Hopefully everyone has hot-patched or updated their server, or at the very least has the spamfilter workaround deployed. If not, do so ASAP!"

Exploitation attempts are said to have commenced a day after the release of the hotfix on November 7, 2026. That said, the exact details of the malicious activity and its end goals are presently unknown. The maintainer described the vulnerability as the "most critical issue" found in UnrealIRCd over the past 15 years.

Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) agencies have time until November 16, 2026, to apply the fixes under Binding Operational Directive (BOD) 26-04: Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk.



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Friday, November 13, 2026

SCKit abuses ScreenConnect to deploy remote access and target technician sessions

Beginning on November 11, 2026, ConnectWise reported an active campaign of a threat actor gaining unauthorized access to cloud-hosted ConnectWise ScreenConnect instances belonging to managed service providers (MSPs). Microsoft Threat Intelligence has confirmed ConnectWise’s reported activity and we have also observed threat actors abusing ScreenConnect, a legitimate remote-support application, to install unauthorized remote-access clients and deploy a malicious worm, SCKit, on ConnectWise customer managed endpoints.

Additionally, Microsoft analyzed the malicious worm’s behavior: deployment starts with commands issued through ScreenConnect to silently install an identical client connected to threat actor-controlled infrastructure. A batch launcher retrieves a PowerShell decoder that decrypts and extracts SCKit using device-specific key material. The toolkit establishes persistence through scheduled tasks and registry Run entries and deploys RelayTrap, a component designed to deliver a malicious payload to a connecting technician.

We have identified that the worm targets IT support technician workstations using the hijacked authenticated ScreenConnect Session and uses the victim’s management console to distribute payloads to other managed devices. The resulting access to either target enables threat actors to remotely administer affected endpoints, execute commands, and deploy further tools independently of the legitimate support instance.

Defenders should investigate technician workstations and downstream affected endpoints. Removing an unauthorized client alone does not remove the toolkit’s persistence or invalidate exposed web sessions. In this blog, we examine SCKit’s attack chain and payload components and provide mitigation guidance, indicators of compromise, and Microsoft Defender XDR advanced hunting queries to help organizations identify and disrupt this activity.

ScreenConnect architecture and attack surfaces

ScreenConnect, formerly ConnectWise Control, is a remote-support and access platform used by MSPs to administer customer devices, often alongside remote monitoring and management (RMM) software. Its operating model has three parts:

  • Management instance. A cloud-hosted or on-premises ScreenConnect server provides the web console and manages sessions. Its relay service carries communication between the technician and endpoint clients.
  • Technician workstation. Support staff sign in to the console through a browser and launch a local host client for interactive support.
  • Customer endpoint. An installed guest, or access, client maintains unattended access and executes commands delivered through ScreenConnect.

An Access session provides persistent, unattended access through the installed client. A Support session is a temporary connection that an end user joins for assistance. ScreenConnect also supports remote commands from the web console without an interactive technician session. The endpoint client receives the command and runs it on the customer device; the technician workstation is not an intermediary for that execution.

Reported server-side entry through extensions

Extensions are add-ons installed on the ScreenConnect server to add features or integrate with other products, including ticketing and RMM tools. ConnectWise Automate was formerly named LabTech; Labtech Plus is a third-party extension, not the Automate product itself. The RMM+ extension family exposes remote-command APIs protected by a separately configured passphrase rather than the technician’s normal console sign-in.

ConnectWise’s advisory describes a reported authentication flaw in RMM+ versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32: when no access key was configured, the extension accepted an empty key. In that configuration, an unauthorized caller could submit commands to the server’s API for delivery to managed endpoints without a normal ScreenConnect user sign-in. ConnectWise is investigating extension abuse as an initial-access route; the entry method for the reported campaign remains under investigation.

A separate path from customer endpoints to technicians

SCKit is a malware toolkit that includes RelayTrap, a malicious replacement for the ScreenConnect client on an affected customer endpoint. RelayTrap is designed to deliver a payload to a technician’s workstation when they connect for support. ConnectWise states that the fix for CVE-2026-84869 blocks the toolkit’s attempted endpoint-to-technician spread. This client-side attack path is separate from the server-side access used to deploy SCKit.

Figure 1. ScreenConnect’s three operating roles and two distinct attack surfaces. The reported RMM+ entry route targets a server-side extension; RelayTrap targets the client on a connecting technician’s workstation.

Attack chain overview

The deployment sequence below runs on the customer endpoint. It establishes a separate remote-access connection and prepares the scripts and RelayTrap component that target a later technician

Figure 2. SCKit deployment on a customer endpoint and its technician-targeting capabilities. The dashed path describes the toolkit’s propagation design, not a confirmed sequence of infections.

1. ScreenConnect commands install an additional client

The threat actor uses the MSP’s ScreenConnect management instance to direct the installed endpoint client to start cmd.exe. That local process invokes curl.exe to download an MSI over HTTP from an attacker-controlled ScreenConnect server. The command requests /Bin/ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi with access-session parameters and a c=Exploited<N> marker (c=Exploited9 in the illustrated command), and saves the installer to C:\Windows\Temp\sc.msi.

Figure 3. Command delivered through ScreenConnect and executed on the customer endpoint to download the client MSI. The attacker-controlled server’s IP is redacted.

Windows Installer then installs the package silently on that endpoint, without restarting it, using /i, /qn, and /norestart. The added client connects to an attacker-controlled ScreenConnect instance, creating a remote-access channel separate from the MSP’s approved instance. Securing access to the legitimate console does not remove this additional client or its connection.

2. A batch launcher retrieves the PowerShell decoder

Further commands on the customer endpoint stage the toolkit. A PowerShell command decodes a URL-safe Base64 string and writes the result to a batch file in Windows Temp. The batch sets BATPATH to its own location, downloads the decoder from ns[.]mo7sen[.]dev/EadF.php?p=4, and starts it with -Mode full.

The decoder reads BATPATH, or falls back to SCKIT_SELF, to locate the launcher. Its hidden-relaunch branch creates a VBScript wrapper and runs it through wscript.exe to start the same batch without a visible window.

The scripts use the following p values at the same server path to request individual components:

Request selectorComponentRole in the chain
p=4DecoderDownloads, decrypts, and expands the toolkit
p=3&m=<machine-guid>Encrypted bundleCarries scripts, configuration, and trap components
p=5SQLite utilitySupports browser-cookie database queries
p=1&m=<machine-guid>Encrypted scriptSupplies the loader’s next PowerShell stage
p=6&m=<machine-guid>Cleanup componentRemoves an old trap before optional redeployment

3. The decoder decrypts and extracts the SCKit bundle

The decoder reads MachineGuid from HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography and includes it as the m request parameter. The response provides a Base64-encoded body and two headers, X-Lab-Half and X-Lab-Salt.

To derive the decryption key, the decoder hashes the UTF-8 machine identifier with SHA-256, XORs that hash with 32 bytes decoded from X-Lab-Half, and appends the machine-identifier bytes to the recovered secret material. PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 then derives a 32-byte key using the response salt and 4,096 iterations.

The decoder uses the first 16 bytes of the decoded response body as the initialization vector (IV). It decrypts the remaining bytes using AES-256-CBC with PKCS7 padding, decompresses the plaintext with GZip, and writes the resulting ZIP archive. The archive is then extracted to %TEMP%\SCKitBundle.

Figure 4. Selected decoder code for key derivation, decryption, decompression, and bundle extraction.

In full mode, the decoder prepares %TEMP%\SCKit\trapkit\payload and stages the watcher, installer, alert script, and RelayTrap.cs. It also copies its batch launcher into the payload directory for RelayTrap to distribute. The copied launcher retrieves the decoder and starts toolkit deployment.

The decoder also stages ToolboxRelayUploader.exe for console-based payload distribution and retrieves sqlite3.exe for browser-cookie queries if a suitable copy is absent. It includes two launch paths: full mode starts the distribution script without a separate configuration file and supplies a local script path; the other path stages a helper and lab-context.json and passes -SkipLocalExecution.

4. Additional component: PowerShell script loader

Alongside the bundle decoder, SCKit includes a separate loader for encrypted PowerShell scripts. Unlike the decoder, which retrieves and expands an archive, this component requests a script using p=1 with the machine identifier. It applies the same secret-recovery, PBKDF2, AES-CBC, and GZip operations, but uses a salt embedded in its source rather than one supplied in a response header.

After decompression, the loader converts the bytes to UTF-8 text and writes %TEMP%\k<32-hex>.ps1, using a newly generated random GUID for the filename. It starts a hidden PowerShell process to run the file with the forwarded arguments, then attempts to remove the script after the child process exits.

Figure 5. Temporary script creation, execution, and cleanup in the PowerShell script loader.

5. RelayTrap adds persistence and targets connecting technicians

On the customer endpoint, persistence keeps the toolkit available for a later support connection. The deployment places scripts under C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap. The RelayTrapLiteAlert value in the machine-wide CurrentVersion\Run key launches an alert script at user logon. A scheduled task starts the watcher with a payload filename and lists of client identifiers and relay hosts to exclude. The -PollSeconds 10 argument configures the watcher to poll every 10 seconds.

The watcher enumerates ScreenConnect client services and reads their executable paths and connection parameters. For each client, its build routine creates a directory under trapbins, copies libraries from that client’s installation, and uses the .NET C# compiler to build RelayTrap.exe. It checks for changes to the source or client libraries before rebuilding.

Figure 6. The endpoint-side watcher builds RelayTrap using libraries from the corresponding ScreenConnect client.

RelayTrap is designed to reuse the customer endpoint’s ScreenConnect connection details in place of its normal client. When a technician connects with a vulnerable host client, RelayTrap attempts to deliver the staged batch launcher through that session. The launcher retrieves the same decoder, extending the toolkit’s deployment design from the customer device to the technician workstation. Configured skip lists exclude specified client identifiers and relay hosts from processing.

ScreenConnect services are also configured for automatic startup. Registry writes target Microsoft Defender Antivirus path exclusions for staged MSI copies and CWInstall_…\Installer.ps1. The installer configuration lists sc[.]payproofkit[.]com and cdn007-digitaldownloads[.]com as additional ScreenConnect MSI sources. A subsequent curl.exe command downloads another client installer from sc[.]payproofkit[.]com.

6. Browser access targets authenticated ScreenConnect sessions

SCKit also targets the technician’s browser, which is used to sign in to the management console. The browser-access code searches Chrome, Edge, Opera, and Opera GX profiles for cookies named .ASPXAUTH. Its database route identifies associated hosts and queries encrypted cookie values. It copies cookie databases and their supporting files, with a volume-shadow-copy fallback for locked databases. The decryption code uses the Chromium master key and the Windows Data Protection API (DPAPI) in the current user’s context, with AES-GCM routines for v10 and v11 cookie values.

The memory-scanning route first examines browser network-service processes identified by network.mojom.NetworkService in their command lines. An embedded C# scanner uses OpenProcess, VirtualQueryEx, and ReadProcessMemory to inspect readable committed memory regions for cookie strings and nearby host strings. If the initial scan finds no candidates, it scans other browser processes.

Figure 7. Database queries and browser-memory scanning target ScreenConnect authentication cookies.

The console-distribution component is designed to combine an authentication cookie with the required anti-forgery and access tokens, enumerate accessible sessions, upload a payload using ToolboxRelayUploader.exe, and queue execution through the Shared Toolbox. The workflow also includes removing the uploaded Toolbox item after distribution.

This component targets the technician’s management-console access, rather than only the original customer device. The account’s permissions determine which additional sessions and devices the distribution workflow can reach.

7. Cleanup and redeployment

The toolkit’s cleanup script places a stop marker in the trap directory. It removes trap-related tasks, services, processes, Run entries, and files, and restores ScreenConnect client services unless client removal was requested. It then removes any remaining stop marker to allow a newly deployed watcher to run.

After running the cleanup script, the decoder’s cleanup mode starts the bundled dropper again unless -NoReArm is set. Cleanup therefore also serves as a path to redeploy the toolkit.

Figure 8. Cleanup restores ScreenConnect services; the decoder checks NoReArm before starting the bundled dropper again.

Mitigation and protection guidance

Secure ScreenConnect administration and technician clients

Address the server-side extension APIs and technician clients separately. Extension authentication and client-side file transfer are different attack surfaces; securing one does not remove the other or an existing endpoint installation.

  • Keep the identified extensions disabled. Follow the vendor advisory for Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM+, RMM Plus Password Link, and RMM+ Password Link. Review their installation and configuration history alongside administrative access.
  • Update technician clients separately from the console. ConnectWise states that ScreenConnect client 26.6.5 and later block the toolkit’s attempted endpoint-to-technician transfer technique. The fix for CVE-2026-84869 was released on September 8, 2026. Verify each technician client’s installed version; a cloud-console update does not automatically update those clients. The vendor bulletin also describes temporary file-transfer restrictions while updates are pending.

Remove established access

  • Investigate through a separate channel. Use Microsoft Defender for Endpoint live response or another approved out-of-band method instead of ScreenConnect on a suspected affected device. Isolate affected endpoints and include connecting technician workstations in scope.
  • Preserve console and endpoint evidence. Retain extension, authentication, Run Command, and Toolbox records together with process, file, task, and registry history. Review Toolbox history for tools removed after use, and inspect queued commands and tools before reconnecting devices.
  • Revoke exposed sessions from a clean device. Invalidate affected ScreenConnect web sessions and associated identity-provider sessions, rotate exposed credentials, and review accounts and permissions. Password changes alone do not address every existing session.
  • Remove persistence and unapproved clients. Validate each client’s enrolled instance and relay destination before removing it. Remove malicious tasks, Run values, trap files, and unauthorized exclusions through approved response tooling. Do not use a cleanup script recovered from the kit as a remediation tool.
  • Verify the complete state before restoring connectivity. Confirm approved services and destinations, effective antivirus settings, and the absence of re-created tasks or scripts. Review tamper-protection events when investigating exclusion changes. Rebuild devices when integrity cannot be established.

Keep Microsoft Defender Antivirus, cloud-delivered protection, and tamper protection enabled. Verify that devices meet the requirements for protecting antivirus exclusions. Maintain an inventory of authorized remote-management instances and use application control to restrict unapproved software.

Microsoft Defender XDR detections

Microsoft Defender XDR customers can use the following Microsoft Defender for Endpoint alert titles to investigate activity associated with this threat. Review related alerts together with device timelines and ScreenConnect audit records to trace command execution, persistence, browser-data access, and network connections.

TacticActivityMicrosoft Defender coverage
ExecutionScreenConnect remote commands launch command-shell, batch, and PowerShell stages.Microsoft Defender Antivirus
– Trojan:Win32/SuspScreenConnectDownload.EA – Trojan:Win32/Tikise.EA!cmd
– Trojan:Win32/SuspScreenConnectDownload.EA

Microsoft Defender for Endpoint
– Suspicious command execution via ScreenConnect
PersistenceAdditional ScreenConnect clients and automatic-start services provide remote access. The RelayTrapLiteAlert Run entry and scheduled tasks launch RelayTrap scripts.Microsoft Defender Antivirus
– Trojan:PowerShell/RelayPersist.FC!MTB

Microsoft Defender for Endpoint
– Suspicious installation of remote management software
– Anomaly detected in ASEP registry
– Suspicious Scheduled Task Process Launched
Defense evasionThe loader attempts to remove its temporary PowerShell payload. Registry writes target Microsoft Defender Antivirus path exclusions.Microsoft Defender Antivirus
– Trojan:PowerShell/SCRelayTrap.EC!MTB

Microsoft Defender for Endpoint
– Possible PowerShell indicator removal
– Suspicious Microsoft Defender Antivirus exclusion
Credential accessThe browser component queries .ASPXAUTH cookies, scans browser memory, and uses DPAPI in its decryption routines.Microsoft Defender Antivirus
– Trojan:BAT/Tikise.A
– Trojan:BAT/Tikise.B
– Trojan:BAT/Tikise.C
– Trojan:BAT/Tikise.D
– Trojan:PowerShell/Tikise.A
– Trojan:PowerShell/Tikise.B
– Trojan:PowerShell/Tikise.C
– Trojan:PowerShell/Tikise.D
– Trojan:PowerShell/Tikise.E
– Trojan:PowerShell/Tikise.F

Microsoft Defender for Endpoint
– Possible theft of passwords and other sensitive web browser information
– Suspicious DPAPI Activity
Command and controlPowerShell and curl.exe retrieve the decoder, toolkit components, and client installers from campaign infrastructure.Microsoft Defender for Endpoint
– Command-line process communicating with malicious network endpoint
– Powershell made a suspicious network connection
Multiple tacticsIntrusion activity spans remote commands, client installation, persistence, and security-setting changes.Microsoft Defender Antivirus
– HackTool:Win32/ToolboxRelayUploader
– Trojan:PowerShell/ScreenConnect.SC!MTB
– Trojan:PowerShell/ScreenConnect.DC!MTB

Microsoft Defender for Endpoint
– Potential human-operated malicious activity

Threat intelligence reports

Microsoft Defender XDR customers can use the following threat analytics report to get the latest intelligence on SCKit and the abuse of ScreenConnect, including protection status, affected assets, and recommended actions for their environment.

Microsoft Defender XDR Threat analytics

SCKit abuses ScreenConnect to deploy remote access and target technician sessions

Advanced hunting queries

Each query below runs independently and uses a 14-day lookback. Adjust the time range to the investigation window and available retention, and correlate results with approved administrative activity.

Connections to campaign infrastructure

Find connections to the listed domains and IP addresses. Review the full destination, initiating process, and approved remote-support infrastructure for each match.

DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(14d)
| where RemoteUrl has_any (
    "ns.mo7sen.dev", "sc.payproofkit.com",
    "newnewnew.gotdns.org", "soxnewwork.homedns.org",
    "cdn007-digitaldownloads.com")
    or RemoteIP in ("185.99.255.28", "155.94.150.39")
| project Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP,
    InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, ReportId

Toolkit command lines and cookie-query activity

Find command lines containing distinctive toolkit names, staging paths, installer markers, or cookie-query strings.

DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(14d)
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "/EadF.php"
    or ProcessCommandLine contains "SCKit"
    or ProcessCommandLine contains "RelayTrap"
    or ProcessCommandLine contains "Panel-Lateral"
    or ProcessCommandLine contains "ToolboxRelayUploader"
    or ProcessCommandLine contains ".ASPXAUTH"
    or ProcessCommandLine contains "c=Exploited"
| project Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, FileName,
    ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, ReportId

Known installer, archive, and uploader files

Find file events for the sc.msi package, staged ZIP, and uploader using their SHA-1 hashes. The query uses SHA-1 because SHA256 is usually unpopulated in DeviceFileEvents. Combine hash matches with command-line and persistence findings.

DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(14d)
| where SHA1 in~ (
    "0be01e7bd69cfdd222645d49bb5ad9961372fef2",
    "3f81c9c874a896c46e4bccea2fad2eaa3d9f2054",
    "13ce33b19daee3963f7e15d461b191c38f6bc0d3")
| project Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath,
    SHA1, InitiatingProcessFileName, ReportId

Registry values referencing RelayTrap

Find writes to the RelayTrapLiteAlert value or values containing RelayTrap. Review the registry key, value data, and initiating process.

DeviceRegistryEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(14d)
| where ActionType == "RegistryValueSet"
| where RegistryValueName =~ "RelayTrapLiteAlert"
    or RegistryValueData contains "RelayTrap"
| project Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, RegistryKey,
    RegistryValueName, RegistryValueData,
    InitiatingProcessFileName, ReportId

RelayTrap scheduled-task events

Find scheduled-task events containing RelayTrap or TrapWatch. Inspect the task definition to identify its triggers, executable, and arguments.

DeviceEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(14d)
| where ActionType contains "ScheduledTask"
| where AdditionalFields contains "RelayTrap"
    or AdditionalFields contains "TrapWatch"
| project Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, ActionType,
    AdditionalFields, InitiatingProcessFileName, ReportId

Microsoft Defender Antivirus path-exclusion writes

Find Microsoft Defender Antivirus path-exclusion registry writes. Review changes naming Windows Temp, ConnectWiseControl_, CWInstall_, or RelayTrap, and verify their authorization and effective policy.

DeviceRegistryEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(14d)
| where ActionType == "RegistryValueSet"
| where RegistryKey contains @"\Windows Defender\Exclusions\Paths"
| project Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, RegistryKey,
    RegistryValueName, RegistryValueData,
    InitiatingProcessFileName, ReportId

SCKit – Generated PowerShell Loader Artifacts

Identifies temporary PowerShell files matching the k<32-hex>.ps1 naming pattern generated by the SCKit loader, potentially revealing staged payloads independently of known file hashes or infrastructure.

DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where FileName matches regex @"(?i)^k[0-9a-f]{32}\.ps1$"
| project Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName,
ActionType, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256,
InitiatingProcessFileName

Indicators of compromise and supporting artifacts

Network addresses are defanged. Use the installer hashes to locate the listed packages, then verify the client’s enrolled ScreenConnect instance and related activity. The toolkit also uses the legitimate SQLite utility; investigate its use alongside the browser-cookie queries described above.

Network infrastructure

Indicator Type Role
ns[.]mo7sen[.]dev Domain Decoder, bundle, script, and utility retrieval
sc[.]payproofkit[.]com Domain Unauthorized ScreenConnect panel and installer source
cdn007-digitaldownloads[.]com Domain Campaign infrastructure; configured installer source
newnewnew[.]gotdns[.]org Domain Associated ScreenConnect relay
soxnewwork[.]homedns[.]org Domain Associated ScreenConnect relay
185[.]99[.]255[.]28 IPv4 Unauthorized ScreenConnect server and installer source
155[.]94[.]150[.]39 IPv4 Address associated with the unauthorized panel

File hashes

Hashes identify individual files. The watcher compiles RelayTrap against local client libraries, and embedded configuration changes script hashes. Use file and process behavior to investigate other builds. The table includes configuration, cleanup, and proof artifacts to support the investigation.

Indicator Type Role
61a672a13f03a9e81f573535ee92b1ed6cb7e848a33a06048865312d4e185ae2 SHA-256 sc.msi installer package
8e6912deed82e80bb6bd66f73509d024b1f78b993515366d8317e69a97cff4f4 SHA-256 Staged toolkit ZIP
8cb5f48bbe70b5248db7f327f3d1ad6649df5c767d2a7e0711ee147fd92e06af SHA-256 ToolboxRelayUploader.exe
94b93c649b0ae0281352da9d01761fa9195ab1e6ac7010af3b9ba1646355eb11 SHA-256 Panel-Lateral-free.ps1
7a9aca9fdd4dcc13fe497cabdb13ca1e5d6a529271c8aa495e5ca1c1c80271ec SHA-256 Panel-Lateral.ps1
b93f10f30ee453d1e1c046fec9d141c41d7680be5cd46c3aeb3febe0f4953b4d SHA-256 LabConfig.ps1 helper
3c7a98f0fdb6235b8076319c74dc1085f7b349b6d750416dd0cadb07d7972ec4 SHA-256 RelayTrap.cs source
d2ed7a7bf4f8ac9c7969e9b3a07ebd4dda0d858f372c876ac0a041611698de9a SHA-256 TrapWatch.ps1
4a1dd3cd2ea14368afadf7e9dfdd63b104e3981ef8c85bbb6510919b810af04b SHA-256 trapkit\install.ps1
cf50d73fa8117a758093b1344de41cd6a6ccddc645cdda1fa91a9264efe93956 SHA-256 Lite-Alert.ps1
81cc2baa35b798d6084bd078662fa29ff28df02c46c6ccdb2b43bde97d19f781 SHA-256 Stage0Loader.ps1
43b7a5e56f9e6c7b74e1ce2b7b5af63f383084625fcc2d3a5985fa1059e2db95 SHA-256 Run-Lateral-Full.bat
50659748723e906c8b3d3c0386bd4cf692f693a3e23639398c1a14d0c31fed61 SHA-256 runnew.cmd
5dd3a6ba806ac472663e243cfc1c034c534d5d9a42ec362c3dbf0f8d950148d0 SHA-256 Stop-LabTrap.bat cleanup-mode launcher
454c43d296b1276bde9a4f6ff1da2221cb35ccdb2fc7991bdd572e45bce12a8a SHA-256 TRAP-PROOF.bat proof artifact
0be01e7bd69cfdd222645d49bb5ad9961372fef2 SHA-1 sc.msi;
3f81c9c874a896c46e4bccea2fad2eaa3d9f2054 SHA-1 Staged toolkit ZIP;
13ce33b19daee3963f7e15d461b191c38f6bc0d3 SHA-1 Uploader;

Client identifiers and behavioral artifacts

Indicator Type Role
2588ef5c15954b10 Client ID Unauthorized ScreenConnect client identifier
ed630cc2c873b091 Client ID Unauthorized ScreenConnect client identifier

References

Learn More

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