Monday, March 2, 2026

Google Develops Merkle Tree Certificates to Enable Quantum-Resistant HTTPS in Chrome

Google has announced a new program in its Chrome browser to ensure that HTTPS certificates are secure against the future risk posed by quantum computers.

"To ensure the scalability and efficiency of the ecosystem, Chrome has no immediate plan to add traditional X.509 certificates containing post-quantum cryptography to the Chrome Root Store," the Chrome Secure Web and Networking Team said.

"Instead, Chrome, in collaboration with other partners, is developing an evolution of HTTPS certificates based on Merkle Tree Certificates (MTCs), currently in development in the PLANTS working group."

As Cloudflare explains, MTC is a proposal for the next generation of the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) used to secure the internet that aims to reduce the number of public keys and signatures in the TLS handshake to the bare minimum required.

Under this model, a Certification Authority (CA) signs a single 'Tree Head' representing potentially millions of certificates, and the 'certificate' sent to the browser is a lightweight proof of inclusion in that tree, Google said.

In other words, MTCs facilitate the adoption of post-quantum algorithms without having to incur additional bandwidth associated with classical X.509 certificate chains. The approach, the company added, decouples the security strength of the corresponding cryptographic algorithm from the size of the data transmitted to the user.

"By shrinking the authentication data in a TLS handshake to the absolute minimum, MTCs aim to keep the post-quantum web as fast and seamless as today's internet, maintaining high performance even as we adopt stronger security," Google said.

The tech giant said it's already experimenting with MTCs with real internet traffic and that it plans to gradually expand the rollout in three distinct phases by the third quarter of 2027 -

  • Phase 1 (In progress) - Google is conducting a feasibility study in collaboration with Cloudflare to evaluate the performance and security of TLS connections relying on MTCs.
  • Phase 2 (Q1 2027) - Google plans to invite Certificate Transparency (CT) Log operators with at least one "usable" log in Chrome before February 1, 2026, to participate in the initial bootstrapping of public MTCs.
  • Phase 3 (Q3 2027) - Google will finalize the requirements for onboarding additional CAs into the new Chrome Quantum-resistant Root Store (CQRS) and corresponding Root Program that only supports MTCs.

"We view the adoption of MTCs and a quantum-resistant root store as a critical opportunity to ensure the robustness of the foundation of today's ecosystem," Google said. By designing for the specific demands of a modern, agile, internet, we can accelerate the adoption of post-quantum resilience for all web users.



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From chaos to catalyst: How CIOs turn post‑merger disorder into a synergy engine

The deal is signed and the press releases are out. For the CEO, it feels like the finish line. For the CIO, now tasked with onboarding new users from the acquired company, it’s just getting started. The post-merger period is where planned synergies and the harsh reality of technology integration collide. This is where the value of a merger is either realized or lost.

The new combined organization is usually saddled with redundant systems, conflicting processes, and plummeting employee productivity. This post-merger hangover can erode deal value for years. But it doesn’t have to be this way. With a strategic platform approach, CIOs can turn this chaos into a predictable engine for savings and efficiency. By applying the findings of IDC’s Business Value of Hybrid Citrix Infrastructure study to a 4,000-user model, organizations can expect over $2.3 million in hard-dollar annual savings. More importantly, this transition paves the way for M&A operational synergies that further amplify the total return on investment.

Phase 1: Conquering the post-merger productivity plunge

The initial 100 days post-close is a race to provide business continuity. The top priority is ensuring that all employees can work together effectively without disruption. This is where the biggest business benefits are realized.

The challenge: The high cost of disruption

On Day 1, you have new employees who need secure access to unfamiliar systems and legacy employees who need access to acquired applications. The result is often a mix of new logins, slow app performance, and network latency that grinds productivity to a halt. The cost of this disruption, combined with the risk of unplanned outages from a fragile, newly combined infrastructure, can be immense.

The platform solution: Driving immediate business value

Citrix’s unified digital platform is the key to delivering a seamless experience and instant, reliable productivity.

By leveraging Citrix DaaS, you can provide all new users with a single, secure portal to access all their necessary applications from Day 1. This bypasses complex network integration and ensures everyone can collaborate effectively. You can further enhance productivity by using Citrix observability to establish a Digital Employee Experience (DEX) baseline, proactively identifying and resolving IT issues before they disrupt thousands of users and impact the bottom line. By prioritizing the user experience and application reliability, organizations can unlock more than $1.2 million in yearly value. Using our previous 4,000-user model, IDC identifies over $1 million in direct productivity improvements, bolstered by an additional $204,000 saved by reducing downtime.

Phase 2: Optimizing the new IT landscape

Once the initial integration fire is out, the CIO’s focus must shift from stability to strategic optimization. This is a long-term effort to build a leaner and more profitable new company by streamlining the new IT environment.

The challenge: redundant systems and IT overload

Your new organization is now paying for redundant infrastructure and an overlapping portfolio of software. At the same time, your IT staff is stretched thin, managing two of everything and fighting fires across unfamiliar systems. This operational drag prevents them from focusing on high-value strategic work.

The platform solution: A new weapon for IT

The Citrix platform provides deep visibility and simplified management needed to make informed, evidence-based decisions that directly benefit the IT organization.

  • Streamlined infrastructure and operations: A consolidated Citrix environment allows you to run applications and workloads more cost-effectively. Remember our 4,000-user example based on the IDC study? With Citrix you can repurpose existing hardware, optimize cloud spend, and consolidate licenses driving $520,000 in annual IT infrastructure cost reductions.
  • Unburdening your IT talent: The simplified, single-pane-of-glass management of the Citrix platform drastically reduces the time your infrastructure, help desk, and application teams spend on day-to-day support. According to IDC, this should free up your most valuable technical resources, generating at least $588,000 in annual IT staff productivity benefits supporting 4,000 new users.

Reinvesting your savings

Here is the most powerful outcome for the strategic CIO. The $1.1 million in combined annual savings from IT infrastructure and staff productivity isn’t just a number that disappears into the corporate balance sheet. These are savings that remain within your IT department.

This is your innovation fund. This is the budget that allows you to move from being a cost center to a value-creating business partner. Imagine reallocating $1.1 million to strategic projects that were previously unfunded: completing an underfunded AI initiative, building a new data analytics platform, or accelerating your Zero Trust security roadmap. By turning the chaos of M&A into a source of efficiency, you create financial freedom to invest in the future of the business. The post-merger period is the CIO’s moment to lead. It’s the opportunity to deliver not just the promised synergies of the deal, but to build a more efficient, productive, and innovative enterprise for the years to come.

Learn more by downloading our whitepaper, The CIO’s M&A Playbook: Accelerating value and de-risking integration and companion e-book, How Citrix cuts months off M&A time to value.



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⚡ Weekly Recap: SD-WAN 0-Day, Critical CVEs, Telegram Probe, Smart TV Proxy SDK and More

This week is not about one big event. It shows where things are moving. Network systems, cloud setups, AI tools, and common apps are all being pushed in different ways. Small gaps in access control, exposed keys, and normal features are being used as entry points.

The pattern becomes clear only when you see everything together. Faster scans, smarter misuse of trusted services, and steady targeting of high-value sectors. Each story adds context. Reading them all gives a fuller picture of how today’s threat landscape is evolving.

⚡ Threat of the Week

Cisco SD-WAN Zero-Day Exploited — A newly disclosed maximum-severity security flaw in Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Controller (formerly vSmart) and Catalyst SD-WAN Manager (formerly vManage) has come under active exploitation in the wild as part of malicious activity that dates back to 2023. The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-20127 (CVSS score: 10.0), allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to bypass authentication and obtain administrative privileges on an affected system by sending a crafted request. Cisco credited the Australian Signals Directorate's Australian Cyber Security Centre (ASD-ACSC) for reporting the vulnerability. The networking equipment major is tracking the exploitation and subsequent post-compromise activity under the moniker UAT-8616, describing the cluster as a "highly sophisticated cyber threat actor." 

🔔 Top News

  • Anthropic Accuses 3 Chinese Firms of Distillation Attacks — Anthropic accused three Chinese AI firms of engaging in concerted "industrial-scale" distillation attack campaigns aimed at extracting information from its model, making it the latest American tech firm to level such claims after OpenAI issued similar complaints. DeepSeek, Moonshot AI, and MiniMax are said to have flooded Claude with large volumes of specially-crafted prompts to elicit responses to train their own proprietary models. Last month, OpenAI submitted an open letter to U.S. legislators, claiming to have observed activity "indicative of ongoing attempts by DeepSeek to distill frontier models of OpenAI and other U.S. frontier labs, including through new, obfuscated methods." The disclosure renewed a debate over training data sources and distillation techniques, with some criticizing the company for training its own systems using copyrighted material without permission. "Anthropic is guilty of stealing training data at a massive scale and has had to pay multibillion-dollar settlements for their theft," xAI CEO Elon Musk said.
  • Google Disrupts UNC2814 GRIDTIDE Campaign — Google disclosed that it worked with industry partners to disrupt the infrastructure of a suspected China-nexus cyber espionage group tracked as UNC2814 that breached at least 53 organizations across 42 countries. The tech giant described UNC2814 as a prolific, elusive actor that has a history of targeting international governments and global telecommunications organizations across Africa, Asia, and the Americas. Central to the hacking group's operations is a novel backdoor dubbed GRIDTIDE that abuses Google Sheets API as a communication channel to disguise C2 traffic and facilitate the transfer of raw data and shell commands. Chinese cyber espionage groups have consistently prioritized the telecommunication sector as a target precisely because of the access their networks provide to sensitive data and lawful intercept infrastructure.
  • Thousands of Public Google Cloud API Keys Exposed with Gemini Access — New research has found that Google Cloud API keys, typically designated as project identifiers for billing purposes, could be abused to authenticate to sensitive Gemini endpoints and access private data. The problem occurs when users enable the Gemini API on a Google Cloud project (i.e., Generative Language API), causing the existing API keys in that project, including those accessible via the website JavaScript code, to gain surreptitious access to Gemini endpoints without any warning or notice. With a valid key, an attacker can access uploaded files, cached data, and even rack up LLM usage charges, Truffle Security said. The issue has since been plugged by Google.
  • UAT-10027 Targets U.S. Education and Healthcare Sectors — A previously undocumented threat activity cluster known as UAT-10027 has been attributed to an ongoing malicious campaign targeting education and healthcare sectors in the U.S. since at least December 2025. The end goal of the attacks is to deliver a never-before-seen backdoor codenamed Dohdoor. "Dohdoor utilizes the DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) technique for command-and-control (C2) communications and has the ability to download and execute other payload binaries reflectively," Cisco Talos said. Analysis of the campaign has revealed no evidence of data exfiltration to date. Although no final payloads have been observed other than what appears to be the Cobalt Strike Beacon to backdoor into the victim's environment, it's believed that UAT-10027's actions are likely driven by financial gain based on the victimology pattern.
  • Claude Code Flaws Allow Remote Code Execution and API Key Exfiltration — Security vulnerabilities in Anthropic Claude Code could have allowed attackers to remotely execute code on users' machines and steal API keys by injecting malicious configurations into repositories, and then waiting for an unsuspecting developer to clone and open an untrustworthy project. The vulnerabilities were addressed between September 2025 and January 2026. "The ability to execute arbitrary commands through repository-controlled configuration files created severe supply chain risks, where a single malicious commit could compromise any developer working with the affected repository," Check Point said. "The integration of AI into development workflows brings tremendous productivity benefits, but also introduces new attack surfaces that weren't present in traditional tools."

‎️‍🔥 Trending CVEs

New vulnerabilities surface daily, and attackers move fast. Reviewing and patching early keeps your systems resilient.

Here are this week’s most critical flaws to check first — CVE-2025-40538, CVE-2025-40539, CVE-2025-40540, CVE-2025-40541 (SolarWinds Serv-U), CVE-2026-20127, CVE-2026-20122, CVE-2026-20126, CVE-2026-20128 (Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN), CVE-2026-25755 (jsPDF), CVE-2025-12543 (HPE Telco Service Activator), CVE-2026-22719, CVE-2026-22720, CVE-2026-22721 (Broadcom VMware Aria Operations), CVE-2026-3061, CVE-2026-3062, CVE-2026-3063 (Google Chrome), CVE-2025-10010 (CryptoPro Secure Disk for BitLocker), CVE-2025-13942, CVE-2025-13943, CVE-2026-1459 (Zyxel), CVE-2025-71210, CVE-2025-71211 (Trend Micro Apex One), CVE-2026-0542 (ServiceNow AI Platform), CVE-2026-24061 (telnetd), CVE-2026-21902 (Juniper Networks Junos OS), CVE-2025-29631, CVE-2025-1242 (Gardyn Home Kit), CVE-2025-15576 (FreeBSD), CVE-2026-26365 (Akamai), CVE-2026-27739 (Angular), and SVE-2025-50109 (Samsung Tizen OS).

🎥 Cybersecurity Webinars

  • Automating Real-World Security Testing to Prove What Actually Works → This webinar explains why one-time security assessments are no longer enough and shows how organizations can automate continuous, real-world testing of their defenses to uncover gaps and measure how well controls hold up against actual attack techniques.
  • When AI Agents Become Your New Attack Surface → This webinar explains that as AI tools turn into autonomous agents that can browse, call APIs, and access internal systems, the security risk expands beyond the model to the entire environment they operate in, requiring stricter access controls, monitoring, and system-level safeguards rather than model testing alone.
  • Quantum Is Coming: Preparing for the End of Today’s Encryption → This webinar explains how future quantum computers could break today’s encryption, why “harvest now, decrypt later” attacks are a real risk, and what practical steps organizations can take now to begin shifting to post-quantum cryptography.

📰 Around the Cyber World

  • UNC6384 Drops New PlugX VariantIIJ-SECT and LAB52 have detailed new activity from the Chinese cyber espionage group UNC6384. The attacks follow a known modus operandi of using STATICPLUGIN, a digitally signed downloader, to deliver updated versions of PlugX using DLL side-loading. The malicious payloads are distributed via phishing emails with meeting invitation lures or through fake software updates.
  • OpenAI Takes Action Against ChatGPT Accounts Used for Harmful Purposes — OpenAI said it took down ChatGPT accounts used for influence operations, phishing, and malware development. This included a possible Chinese intelligence operation in which an individual associated with Chinese law enforcement used the AI tool for covert influence operations against domestic and foreign adversaries. The company also acted against clusters conducting reconnaissance about U.S. persons and federal building locations, online romance scams, and Russian influence operations across Africa by generating social media posts and long-form commentary articles. "Unusually, this scam network combined manual ChatGPT prompting and an automated AI chatbot to try to entrap its targets," OpenAI said about the scam operation running out of Cambodia. Some of these scams targeted Indonesian loveseekers. Other scams used ChatGPT to create content that purported to come from fictitious law firms, as well as impersonate real attorneys and U.S. law enforcement as part of a recovery scam targeting fraud victims.
  • AI-Induced Lateral Movement — New research from Orca Security has highlighted how AI can become a "third dimension" in the world of lateral movement, after network and identity, allowing attackers to expand their reach. "By injecting prompt injections in overlooked fields that are fetched by AI agents, hackers can trick LLMs, abuse Agentic tools, and carry out significant security incidents," Orca said. "LLMs don’t truly understand the difference between data and instructions, and when tool output is fed back into the model, it can be interpreted as something to act on. Which opens a window to AI-induced Lateral Movement (AILM) activities." 
  • Russia Launches Probe into Telegram CEO — Russian authorities launched a criminal investigation of Telegram founder and CEO Pavel Durov. He is allegedly charged with promoting and facilitating terrorist activity on the messaging platform by failing to respond to law enforcement takedown requests. Russian officials have accused Durov of choosing a "path of violence and permissiveness" by not cooperating with its law enforcement agencies, according to the Rossiyskaya Gazeta. The move comes after Russia began restricting access to Telegram in the country in favor of MAX. Last month, Durov called it an "attempt to force its citizens to switch to a state-controlled app built for surveillance and political censorship."
  • Hacked Prayer App Sends Surrender Messages — According to reports from The Wall Street Journal and WIRED, unidentified hackers seized control of an Iranian prayer app during a joint U.S.-Israeli attack to send messages urging the Iranian military to lay down their weapons and promising amnesty if they surrendered. The messages were sent in the form of push notifications to the BadeSaba Calendar app. It's currently not clear who is behind the hack. The app has been downloaded more than 5 million times from the Google Play Store. Following the U.S.-Israel war on Iran, the government shut down all internet access in the country.
  • Smart TVs Turned Into AI Content Scrapers — Several smart TV app makers are deploying a new SDK named Bright SDK that lets users see fewer ads but also stealthily turns their TV into a node in a global proxy network that crawls and scrapes the web. Bright Data, the company behind the SDK, claims to operate more than 150 million residential proxy IP addresses spanning 195 countries.
  • Multiple Stealer Malware Families Detected — Multiple information stealer families have been detected in the wild. This includes Arkanix, CharlieKirk GRABBER, ComSuon, DarkCloud, MawaStealer, and MioLab (NovaStealer). Kaspersky's analysis of Arkanix has revealed that it was likely developed as an LLM-assisted experiment, shrinking development time and costs. While Arkanix was promoted on underground forums in October 2025, the malware-as-a-service (MaaS) appears to have been taken down towards the end of 2025. The findings demonstrate continued demand for off-the-key stealer malware, creating an ecosystem that enables other threat actors to purchase stealer logs for obtaining initial access to targets. "Raw Infostealer logs are meticulously filtered by corporate domain, packaged, and sold to initial access brokers and attackers specifically looking for frictionless entry points into high-value corporate networks," Hudson Rock said. The development has been complemented by underground networks turning into cybercrime marketplaces, complete with reputation systems, escrow, and specialist vendors, Varonis added. "One operator runs infostealers across thousands of machines. Another extracts and sorts the credentials. A third sells curated access," security researcher Daniel Kelley said. "A fourth deploys the ransomware. Each person focuses on what they do best, and the ecosystem has become ruthlessly efficient."
  • Chilean National Extradited to U.S. to Face Financial Fraud Crimes — Alex Rodrigo Valenzuela Monje (aka VAL4K), a 24-year-old Chilean national, has been extradited to the U.S. over his alleged role in running a cybercrime operation that involved the trafficking of payment card data. The defendant is accused of trafficking stolen credit card numbers and information for over 26,500 credit cards. "From at least May 2021 to August 2023, Valenzuela Monje operated an illegal online card shop, selling dumps of unauthorized access devices through Telegram channels," the U.S. Justice Department said. "He allegedly operated the channels known as MacacoCC Collective and Novato Carding, offering payment card data for virtually all U.S. payment cards."
  • New FUNNULL Infrastructure Discovered — QiAnXin has flagged new infrastructure associated with FUNNULL, a Philippines-based content delivery network (CDN) sanctioned last year by the U.S. Treasury for facilitating cyber scam operations. "Previously, their main method was to poison existing public CDN services; now they have evolved to independently develop complete server-side attack suites (RingH23), actively infiltrating CDN nodes, demonstrating a significant improvement in control and technical sophistication," QiAnXin XLab said. Two independent supply chain infection channels have been identified: the compromise of maccms.la to distribute a malicious PHP backdoor through its update channel, and the compromise of the GoEdge CDN management node to implant an infection module, and deploy the proprietary RingH23 attack suite to all edge nodes via SSH remote commands. The campaign has compromised 10,748 unique IP addresses, predominantly video streaming sites.
  • Spike in Scans for SonicWall Devices — GreyNoise said it detected a spike in scans for SonicWall devices originating from the infrastructure of a known proxy provider. The activity started on February 22, 2026, and scanned for exposed SonicWall SSL VPNs. A total of 84,142 scanning sessions targeting SonicWall SonicOS infrastructure were observed between February 22 and February 25, 2026. The scanning came from 4,305 unique IP addresses across 20 autonomous systems. "Ninety-two percent of sessions probed a single API endpoint to determine whether SSL VPN is enabled — the prerequisite check before credential attacks," GreyNoise said. "A commercial proxy service delivered 32% of campaign volume through 4,102 rotating exit IPs in two surgical bursts totaling 16 hours."
  • Google Removes 115 Android Apps Tied to Ad Fraud — A new ad fraud operation dubbed Genisys involved hijacking Android devices to run malicious activity in the background. The activity leveraged a set of 115 apps that stealthily opened websites inside hidden browser windows to generate ad display revenue for their creators. More than 500 domains were generated using AI tools to serve the ads. "They appear as generic blogs, news-style sites, and informational properties produced at scale, built not to attract real audiences but to receive and monetize fraudulent traffic," Integral Ads said. The apps have since been removed by Google. The findings build on another mobile ad fraud scheme called Arcade in which mobile apps generated hidden in-app browser activity to load websites in the background and convert mobile-origin activity into web traffic.
  • Zerobot Exploits Flaws in n8n and Tenda Routers — A Mirai-based IoT botnet named Zerobot has been observed exploiting vulnerabilities in the n8n AI automation platform (CVE-2025-68613) and Tenda routers (CVE-2025-7544) to expand its reach. The activity was first detected in January 2026. "Targeting of the n8n vulnerability is particularly interesting: Botnets typically exploit Internet of Things (IoT) devices, such as security cameras, DVRs, and routers, but n8n falls into an entirely different category," Akamai said. "Although this isn’t entirely new behavior for botnets, this sort of targeting presents a greater danger to organizations by exposing more critical infrastructure to compromise as the n8n exploit could enable lateral movement for a threat actor."
  • Various ClickFix Campaigns Spotted — Threat hunters disclosed multiple ClickFix campaigns, including one leading to a hands-on-keyboard attack that deployed the Termite ransomware. The attack has been attributed to a group known as Velvet Tempest (DEV-0504). Another ClickFix campaign, codenamed OCRFix, used websites impersonating the Tesseract OCR tool as a launchpad for delivering malware that uses EtherHiding to retrieve the C2 server, send system information, and await further instructions. A third campaign has been found employing fake GitHub repositories impersonating software companies and leveraging ClickFix to social-engineer victims into installing infostealers, such as SHub Stealer v2.0.
  • GTFire Phishing Scheme Detailed — A phishing campaign dubbed GTFire is abusing Google Firebase to host phishing pages and Google Translate to disguise the malicious URLs and bypass email and web security filters. "By chaining these services together, the attackers create phishing links that appear benign, leverage Google’s reputation, and dynamically redirect victims to brand‑impersonating login pages," Group-IB said. "Once credentials are submitted and harvested, victims are often redirected back to the legitimate website of the targeted organization, reducing suspicion and delaying incident response." The campaign is estimated to have harvested thousands of stolen credentials associated with more than a thousand organizations, spanning over a hundred countries and hundreds of industries. The threat actor behind the operation has been active since at least January 1, 2022. Mexico, the U.S., Spain, India, and Argentina are among the prominent targets.
  • C77L Ransomware Targets Russia — A ransomware operation called C77L has been tied to at least 40 attacks on Russian and Belarusian enterprises since March 2025. The group is assessed to be operating out of Iran. Initial access to target networks is accomplished via weak passwords for publicly available RDP and VPN endpoints. "The targets of attacks are Windows systems due to their overwhelming predominance in the IT infrastructures of medium and small businesses," F6 said.
  • RESURGE Malware Can Be Dormant on Infected Ivanti Devices — The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) updated its original alert for RESURGE, a piece of malware deployed as part of exploitation activity targeting a now-patched security flaw in Ivanti Connect Secure (ICS) appliances. The agency said "RESURGE has sophisticated network-level evasion and authentication techniques, leveraging advanced cryptographic methods and forged TLS certificates to facilitate covert communications," adding "RESURGE can remain latent on systems until a remote actor attempts to connect to the compromised device."
  • 30 Members of The Com Arrested — A coordinated law enforcement operation led by Europol detained 30 individuals connected to an underground online community known as The Com. The operation, launched in January 2025, has been codenamed Project Compass. An additional 179 members were also identified as part of the investigation. The Com is the name assigned to a loose-knit cybercrime collective that has been linked to online doxxing, harassment, threats of violence, extortion, sexual exploitation, phishing, SIM swapping, ransomware, and other digital crimes. Europol described The Com as a decentralized extremist network.
  • U.K. Government Cuts Cyber Attack Fix Times by 84% — The U.K. government has claimed it has reduced its backlog of critical vulnerabilities by 75% and reduced cyber attack fix times by 87%. Serious security weaknesses in public sector websites are fixed six times faster, cutting the average time from nearly two months to just over a week, the U.K. government said in an update published on 26 February.
  • Poland Dismantles Organized Crime Group — Poland's Central Bureau for Combating Cybercrime (CBZC) dismantled an organized group that used phishing to take control of Facebook accounts and extract BLIK payment codes from victims. Eleven members of an organized criminal group operating in Poland and Germany between May 2022 and May 2024 were identified. Six suspects have been placed in pretrial detention as part of the investigation, and over 100,000 credentials were seized. The group used "phishing techniques to obtain login details for Facebook accounts, and then gained access to them and used instant messaging to extort BLIK codes from other users of the portal," CBZC said.
  • Hacker Exploits Clade to Target Mexican Government Sites — An unknown hacker exploited Anthropic's Claude chatbot to carry out attacks against Mexican government agencies, according to a report by Gambit Security. "Within a month of the initial compromise, ten government bodies and one financial institution were affected, approximately 195 million identities exposed, and roughly 150GB of data exfiltrated: tax records, civil registry files, voter data," the company said. "The attacker even built an automated system that forges official government tax certificates using live data. It was orchestrated by an individual actor directing AI to operate as a nation-state-level team of operators and analysts." The operation ran on more than 1,000 prompts and regularly passed information to OpenAI's GPT-4.1 for analysis. The breach began in late December 2025 and continued for about a month. Anthropic has since disrupted the activity and banned all of the accounts involved. The attacks haven't been attributed to a specific group.
  • Titus → It is an open-source tool from Praetorian that scans code, files, repositories, and traffic to find leaked credentials like API keys and tokens. It uses hundreds of pattern rules and can check whether a detected secret is actually active. You can run it as a command-line tool, use it inside other tools as a Go library, or use it as extensions in Burp Suite or a browser to uncover credential leaks in different workflows.
  • Sirius → It is an open-source vulnerability scanning platform on GitHub that automates network and system security checks to find weaknesses and risks in infrastructure. It combines community-driven security data with automated tests, runs within containers, and gives operators a unified view of vulnerabilities to prioritize remediation.

Disclaimer: These tools are provided for research and educational use only. They are not security-audited and may cause harm if misused. Review the code, test in controlled environments, and comply with all applicable laws and policies.

Conclusion

Viewed one by one, these incidents seem contained. Seen together, they show how risk now flows across connected systems that organizations rely on daily. Infrastructure, AI platforms, cloud services, and third-party tools are deeply intertwined, and strain in one area often exposes another.

The takeaway is clarity, not alarm. Adversaries are improving efficiency, scaling access, and operating inside normal processes. Reading through each report helps map that shift and understand how the broader environment is changing.



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How to Protect Your SaaS from Bot Attacks with SafeLine WAF

Most SaaS teams remember the day their user traffic started growing fast. Few notice the day bots started targeting them.

On paper, everything looks great: more sign-ups, more sessions, more API calls. But in reality, something feels off:

  • Sign-ups increase, but users aren’t activating.
  • Server costs rise faster than revenue.
  • Logs are filled with repeated requests from strange user agents.

If this sounds familiar, it’s not just a sign of popularity. Your app is under constant automated attack, even if no ransom emails have arrived. Your load balancer sees traffic. Your product team sees “growth”. Your database sees pain.

This is where a WAF like SafeLine fits in.

SafeLine is a self-hosted web application firewall (WAF) that sits in front of your app and inspects every HTTP request before it reaches your code. 

It does not just look for broken packets or known bad IPs. It watches how traffic behaves: what it sends, how fast, in what patterns, and against which endpoints.

In this article, we’ll show what real attacks look like for a SaaS product, how bots exploit business logic, and how SafeLine can protect your app without adding extra work for your team.

The Attacks SaaS Products Actually See

When people say “web attacks”, many think only about SQL injection or XSS. Those still exist, and SafeLine blocks them with a built‑in Semantic Analysis Engine. 

SafeLine's Semantic Analysis Engine reads HTTP requests like a security engineer. Instead of just hunting keywords, it understands context, decoding payloads, spotting weird field types, and recognizing attack intent across SQL, JS, NoSQL, and modern frameworks. Blocks sophisticated bots and zero-days with 99.45% accuracy and no constant rule tweaks needed.

Malicious Requests Blocked by SafeLine

But for SaaS, the most painful attacks are not always the most “technical”. They are the ones that bend your business rules.

Common examples:

  • Fake sign‑ups: Automated sign‑up scripts farm free trials, burn invitation codes, or harvest discount coupons.
  • Credential stuffing: Bots try leaked username/password pairs against your login endpoint until something works.
  • API scraping: Competitors or generic scrapers walk your API, page by page, copying your content or pricing.
  • Abusive automation: One user (or botnet) triggers heavy background jobs, export tasks, or webhook storms that you pay for.
  • Bot traffic spikes: Sudden waves of scripted requests hit the same endpoints, not big enough to be a classic DDoS, but enough to slow everything down.

The tricky part is that all these requests look “normal” at the HTTP level.

They are:

  • Well‑formed
  • Often over HTTPS
  • Using your documented API

Why a Self‑Hosted WAF Makes Sense for SaaS

There are many cloud WAF products. They work well for a lot of teams. But SaaS products have some special concerns:

  • Data control: You may not want every request and response to flow through another company’s cloud.
  • Latency and routing: Extra external hops can matter for global users.
  • Debugging: When a cloud WAF blocks something, you often see a vague message, not full context.

SafeLine takes a different path:

  • It is self‑hosted and runs as a reverse proxy in front of your app.
  • You keep full control over logs and traffic.
  • You see exactly why a request was blocked, in your own dashboards.

For SaaS teams, that means you can:

  • Meet stricter customer or compliance demands about where data flows.
  • Tune rules without opening a support ticket.
  • Treat your WAF configuration as part of your normal infrastructure, not a black‑box service.

How SafeLine Sees and Stops Bot Traffic

Bots are not one thing. Some are clumsy scripts; some are almost indistinguishable from real users. SafeLine uses several layers to deal with them.

1. Understanding traffic, not just signatures

SafeLine combines rule‑based checks with semantic analysis of requests.

In practice, that means it looks at:

  • Parameters and payloads (for injection attempts, strange encodings, exploit patterns).
  • URL structures and access paths (for scanners, crawlers, and exploit kits).
  • Frequency and distribution of calls (for login abuse, scraping, and subtle flood attacks).

This is what allows it to:

  • Block classic web attacks with a low false positive rate.
  • Detect weird patterns that do not match any single “signature” but clearly are not normal user behavior.

2. Anti‑Bot challenges

Some bots can only be stopped by forcing them to prove they are not machines. SafeLine includes an Anti‑Bot Challenge feature: when it detects suspicious traffic, it can present a challenge that real browsers handle, but bots fail.

Key points:

  • Normal human users barely notice it.
  • Basic crawlers, scripts, and abuse tools get blocked or slowed down sharply.
  • You decide where to enable it: sign‑up, login, pricing pages, or specific APIs.

3. Rate limiting as a safety net

For SaaS, “too much of a good thing” is a real problem. One overly eager integration, one faulty script, or one attack can exhaust resources.

SafeLine’s rate limiting lets you:

  • Limit how many requests an IP or token can make to specific endpoints per second, minute, or hour.
  • Protect login, sign‑up, and expensive APIs from brute force and floods.
  • Keep your application stable even under abnormal spikes.

This is essential for:

  • Protecting free tiers from abuse.
  • Keeping “unlimited API calls” from turning into “unlimited cloud bills”.

4. Identity and access controls

Some parts of your SaaS should never be public:

  • Internal dashboards
  • Early beta features
  • Region‑specific admin tools

SafeLine provides an authentication challenge feature. When enabled, visitors must enter a password you set before they can continue.

This is a simple way to:

  • Hide internal or staging environments from scanners and bots.
  • Reduce the blast radius of misconfigured or forgotten routes.

A Simple Story: A SaaS Team vs. Bot Abuse

There is a small B2B SaaS product:

  • Less than 10 people on the team.
  • Nginx fronting a set of REST APIs.
  • Free trials, public sign‑up, and open API docs.

At first, numbers look good. Then:

  • Fake sign‑ups climb to 150–200 per day.
  • CPU peaks hit 70% because of login attempts and abuse traffic.
  • The database grows faster than paying users.

When they add SafeLine:

  • They deploy it behind Nginx, as a self‑hosted WAF.
  • They enable bot detection, rate limits on sign‑up and login, and basic abuse rules for new accounts.

Within one week:

  • Fake registrations fall below 10 per day.
  • CPU stabilizes around 40%.
  • Conversion starts to recover, because real users face fewer obstacles.

The interesting part is not the numbers.

It is what the team did not have to do:

  • They did not design complex in‑app throttling.
  • They did not maintain custom bot‑blocking code.
  • They did not argue for months about whether they could send traffic to an external inspection service.

SafeLine quietly took the first wave of abuse, and the product team focused again on features and customers.

How SafeLine Fits into a SaaS Stack

From an architecture point of view, SafeLine behaves like a reverse proxy:

  • External traffic → SafeLine → your Nginx / app servers.

This makes it easier to adopt without rewriting your product.

You can:

  • Put SafeLine in front of your main web app and API gateway.
  • Slowly route more domains and services through it as you gain confidence.

The SafeLine dashboard then becomes your “security console”:

  • You see attack logs: which IP tried what, which rule triggered, what payload was blocked.
  • You see trends: increased scans, new kinds of payloads, or growing bot patterns.
  • You can adjust rules and protections in a few clicks.

Deployment and Ease of Use

SafeLine WAF is designed for SaaS operators who may not have dedicated security teams. 

A deployment typically takes less than 10 minutes. Below is the one-click deployment command:

bash -c "$(curl -fsSLk https://bit.ly/4r4l4VC)" -- --en

See the official documentation for detailed instructions: https://docs.waf.chaitin.com/en/GetStarted/Deploy

More importantly, SafeLine still provides a free edition for all users worldwide. So once you install it, it's ready to use right out of the box—no extra costs at all. Only when you need advanced features is a paid license required.

After installation, you’ll see a clean interface with a super simple and intuitive configuration experience. Protect your first app by following this official tutorial: https://docs.waf.chaitin.com/en/GetStarted/AddApplication.

Once configured, the WAF operates autonomously while providing detailed visibility into threats and mitigation actions.

Looking Ahead: Continuous Security

The threat landscape is constantly evolving. Bots are becoming smarter, attacks are increasingly targeted, and SaaS platforms continue to grow in complexity. To stay ahead, companies must:

  • Monitor traffic behavior continuously
  • Adapt rate-limiting and bot detection rules dynamically
  • Regularly audit logs for unusual activity
  • Ensure sensitive endpoints have layered protections

SafeLine’s approach aligns perfectly with these needs, providing a flexible, data-driven security layer that grows with your SaaS business. 

For those interested in exploring the technology firsthand, visit the SafeLine GitHub Repository or experience the Live Demo. Or you can just go straight to install it and try it for free forever!

Found this article interesting? This article is a contributed piece from one of our valued partners. Follow us on Google News, Twitter and LinkedIn to read more exclusive content we post.



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APT28 Tied to CVE-2026-21513 MSHTML 0-Day Exploited Before Feb 2026 Patch Tuesday

A recently disclosed security flaw patched by Microsoft may have been exploited by the Russia-linked state-sponsored threat actor known as APT28, according to new findings from Akamai.

The vulnerability in question is CVE-2026-21513 (CVSS score: 8.8), a high-severity security feature bypass affecting the MSHTML Framework.

"Protection mechanism failure in MSHTML Framework allows an unauthorized attacker to bypass a security feature over a network," Microsoft noted in its advisory for the flaw. It was fixed by the Windows maker as part of its February 2026 Patch Tuesday update.

However, the tech giant also noted that the vulnerability had been exploited as a zero-day in real-world attacks, crediting the Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC), Microsoft Security Response Center (MSRC), and Office Product Group Security Team, along with Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG), for reporting it.

In a hypothetical attack scenario, a threat actor could weaponize the vulnerability by persuading a victim to open a malicious HTML file or shortcut (LNK) file delivered through a link or as an email attachment.

Once the crafted file is opened, it manipulates browser and Windows Shell handling, causing the content to be executed by the operating system, Microsoft noted. This, in turn, allows the attacker to bypass security features and potentially achieve code execution.

While the company has not officially shared any details about the zero-day exploitation effort, Akamai said it identified a malicious artifact that was uploaded to VirusTotal on January 30, 2026, and is associated with infrastructure linked to APT28.

It's worth noting that the sample was flagged by the Computer Emergency Response Team of Ukraine (CERT-UA) early last month in connection with APT28's attacks exploiting another security flaw in Microsoft Office (CVE-2026-21509, CVSS score: 7.8).

The web infrastructure company said CVE-2026-21513 is rooted in the logic within "ieframe.dll" that handles hyperlink navigation, and that it's the result of insufficient validation of the target URL, which allows attacker-controlled input to reach code paths that invoke ShellExecuteExW. This, in turn, enables execution of local or remote resources outside the intended browser security context.

"This payload involves a specially crafted Windows Shortcut (LNK) that embeds an HTML file immediately after the standard LNK structure," security researcher Maor Dahan said. "The LNK file initiates communication with the domain wellnesscaremed[.]com, which is attributed to APT28 and has been in extensive use for the campaign's multistage payloads. The exploit leverages nested iframes and multiple DOM contexts to manipulate trust boundaries."

Akamai noted that the technique makes it possible for an attacker to bypass Mark-of-the-Web (MotW) and Internet Explorer Enhanced Security Configuration (IE ESC), leading to a downgrade of the security context and ultimately facilitating the execution of malicious code outside of the browser sandbox via ShellExecuteExW.

"While the observed campaign leverages malicious LNK files, the vulnerable code path can be triggered through any component embedding MSHTML," the company added. "Therefore, additional delivery mechanisms beyond LNK-based phishing should be expected."



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North Korean Hackers Publish 26 npm Packages Hiding Pastebin C2 for Cross-Platform RAT

Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed a new iteration of the ongoing Contagious Interview campaign, where the North Korean threat actors have published a set of 26 malicious packages to the npm registry.

The packages masquerade as developer tools, but contain functionality to extract the actual command-and-control (C2) by using seemingly harmless Pastebin content as a dead drop resolver and ultimately drop a developer-targeted credential stealer and remote access trojan. The C2 infrastructure is hosted on Vercel across 31 deployments.

The campaign, tracked by Socket and kmsec.uk's Kieran Miyamoto is being tracked under the moniker StegaBin.

"The loader extracts C2 URLs steganographically encoded within three Pastebin pastes, innocuous computer science essays in which characters at evenly-spaced positions have been replaced to spell out hidden infrastructure addresses," Socket researchers Philipp Burckhardt and Peter van der Zee said.

The list of the malicious npm packages is as follows -

  • argonist@0.41.0
  • bcryptance@6.5.2
  • bee-quarl@2.1.2
  • bubble-core@6.26.2
  • corstoken@2.14.7
  • daytonjs@1.11.20
  • ether-lint@5.9.4
  • expressjs-lint@5.3.2
  • fastify-lint@5.8.0
  • formmiderable@3.5.7
  • hapi-lint@19.1.2
  • iosysredis@5.13.2
  • jslint-config@10.22.2
  • jsnwebapptoken@8.40.2
  • kafkajs-lint@2.21.3
  • loadash-lint@4.17.24
  • mqttoken@5.40.2
  • prism-lint@7.4.2
  • promanage@6.0.21
  • sequelization@6.40.2
  • typoriem@0.4.17
  • undicy-lint@7.23.1
  • uuindex@13.1.0
  • vitetest-lint@4.1.21
  • windowston@3.19.2
  • zoddle@4.4.2

All identified packages come with an install script ("install.js") that's automatically executed during package installation, which, in turn, runs the malicious payload located in "vendor/scrypt-js/version.js." Another common aspect that unites the 26 packages is that they explicitly declare the legitimate package they are typosquatting as a dependency, likely in an attempt to make them appear credible.

The payload serves as a text steganography decoder by contacting a Pastebin URL and extracting its contents to retrieve the actual C2 Vercel URLs. While the pastes seemingly contain a benign essay about computer science, the decoder is designed to look at specific characters in certain positions in the text and string them together to create a list of C2 domains.

"The decoder strips zero-width Unicode characters, reads a 5-digit length marker from the beginning, calculates evenly-spaced character positions throughout the text, and extracts the characters at those positions," Socket said. "The extracted characters are then split on a ||| separator (with an ===END=== termination marker) to produce an array of C2 domain names."

The malware then reaches out to the decoded domain to fetch platform-specific payloads for Windows, macOS, and Linux, a tactic widely observed in the Contagious Interview campaign. One such domain, "ext-checkdin.vercel[.]app" has been found to serve a shell script, which then contacts the same URL to retrieve a RAT component.

The Trojan connects to 103.106.67[.]63:1244 to await further instructions that allow it to change the current directory and execute shell commands, through which a comprehensive intelligence collection suite is deployed. It contains nine modules to facilitate Microsoft Visual Studio Code (VS Code) persistence, keylogging and clipboard theft, browser credential harvesting, TruffleHog secret scanning, and Git repository and SSH key exfiltration -

  • vs, which uses a malicious tasks.json file to contact a Vercel domain every time a project is opened in VS Code by taking advantage of the runOn: "folderOpen" trigger. The module specifically scans the victim's VS Code config directory across all three platforms and writes the malicious tasks.json directly into it.
  • clip, which acts as a keylogger, mouse tracker, and clipboard stealer with support for active window tracking and conducts periodic exfiltration every 10 minutes.
  • bro, which is a Python payload to steal browser credential stores.
  • j, which is a Node.js module used for browser and cryptocurrency theft by targeting Google Chrome, Brave, Firefox, Opera, and Microsoft Edge, and extensions like MetaMask, Phantom, Coinbase Wallet, Binance, Trust, Exodus, and Keplr, among others. On macOS, it also targets the iCloud Keychain.
  • z, which enumerates the file system and steals files matching certain predefined patterns.
  • n, which acts as a RAT to grant the attacker the ability to remotely control the infected host in real-time via a persistent WebSocket connection to 103.106.67[.]63:1247 and exfiltrate data of interest over FTP.
  • truffle, which downloads the legitimate TruffleHog secrets scanner from the official GitHub page to discover and exfiltrate developer secrets.
  • git, which collects files from .ssh directories, extracts Git credentials, and scans repositories.
  • sched, which is the same as "vendor/scrypt-js/version.js" and is redeployed as a persistence mechanism.

"While previous waves of the Contagious Interview campaign relied on relatively straightforward malicious scripts and Bitbucket-hosted payloads, this latest iteration demonstrates a concerted effort to bypass both automated detection and human review," Socket concluded.

"The use of character-level steganography on Pastebin and multi-stage Vercel routing points to an adversary that is refining its evasion techniques and attempting to make its operations more resilient."

The disclosure comes as the North Korean actors have also been observed publishing malicious npm packages (e.g., express-core-validator) to fetch a next-stage JavaScript payload hosted on Google Drive.

"Only a single package has been published with this new technique," Miyamoto said. "It is likely FAMOUS CHOLLIMA will continue to leverage multiple techniques and infrastructure to deliver follow-on payloads. It is unlikely this signals a complete overhaul of their stager behaviour on npm."



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Saturday, February 28, 2026

SentinelOne Intelligence Brief: Iranian Cyber Activity Outlook

To Our Partners and Customers

The following intelligence brief was sent to all SentinelOne partners and customers today:

Executive Summary

Recent U.S. and Israeli strikes against Iranian targets, followed by Iranian attacks on multiple regional locations, present a highly dynamic geopolitical situation with credible cyber threat implications. Iran has historically incorporated cyber operations into periods of regional escalation.

Given the rapid escalation of geopolitical tensions, we assess that Iranian state-aligned cyber activity is likely to intensify in the near-term based on a long track record of leveraging cyber operations for asymmetric retaliation, coercive signaling, and strategic messaging. Prior campaigns, including destructive wiper malware, infrastructure disruption, and influence operations masquerading as ‘hacktivism’, demonstrate both capability and intent to operate in the cyber domain alongside kinetic action.

At the time of publication, SentinelOne has not attributed significant malicious cyber activity directly to these recent events. We have no indications that SentinelOne or our customers are being specifically targeted in connection with these developments.

This report outlines Iran’s historical cyber posture, relevant tactics and tradecraft, and our forward-looking assessment of potential cyber responses in the days and weeks following the airstrikes.

We assess with high confidence that organizations in Israel, the United States, and allied nations are likely to face direct or indirect targeting – particularly within government, critical infrastructure, defense, financial services, academic, and media sectors.

We recommend that all clients, especially those operating in, or supporting, U.S. and Israeli infrastructure, review their security posture and preparedness accordingly.

This assessment is current as of February 28, 2026 and reflects a rapidly evolving threat environment.

Iran’s Cyber Operations to Date

Iran presents a mature, well-resourced cyberthreat based on more than fifteen years of experience across a wide range of malicious cyber events.

Iran uses a diverse set of cyber tools to further state objectives, particularly preservation of the Iranian regime, including:

  • Espionage and credential theft via APT34, APT39, APT42, and MuddyWater, targeting a wide range of military, civilian, telecommunications, and academic institutions, particularly against regional targets (Israel, Middle East) and the United States
  • Disruptive and destructive campaigns, notably wiper malware such as Shamoon and MeteorExpress
  • Targeted spearphishing and social engineering campaigns, supporting strategic intelligence collection across multiple industries
  • Fake hacktivist personas for plausible deniability and psychological impact (e.g., DarkBit, Cyber Av3ngers)
  • Coordinated disinformation and influence ops across Telegram, X, and compromised news outlets
  • Internet blackouts within Iran to control public opinion and narrative, while similarly countering the effect of foreign influence operations
  • Proxy ransomware and criminal fronts blurring lines between state and financially motivated actors

Iranian cyber actors previously aligned their operations with kinetic campaigns, often acting as a force multiplier for regional allies like Hamas or as a standalone tool of retaliation. The TTPs employed by Iranian hacktivists increasingly mirror those used by state-sponsored APTs, raising critical questions about capability sharing and formal command-and-control relationships within this environment.

Expected Iranian Cyber Response to Current Events

1 – Precision Espionage Operations

Expect escalated targeting of Israeli defense, government, and intelligence networks using spearphishing, credential harvesting, and deployment of custom malware. Historically, groups such as APT34 (OilRig) and APT42 (TA453) leveraged legitimate access to move laterally and exfiltrate strategic intelligence. Additionally, U.S. military and government organizations will likely be targeted in similar campaigns.

Anticipated Targets:

  • U.S. military and government organizations
  • Israeli defense entities and affiliated research organizations
  • U.S. and Israeli diplomatic infrastructure
  • Defense contractors and supply chain partners
  • Strategic allies and locations in theater

2 – Disruptive & Destructive Tactics

Iran has a well-documented history of using destructive malware and DDoS attacks to disrupt the critical infrastructure of its adversaries. We assess a high likelihood of similar tactics being deployed against U.S. and Israeli sectors, particularly utilities and public-facing systems.

Key techniques include:

  • Deployment of wipers via fake hacktivist personas or directly-attributed APT clusters
  • Exploitation of unpatched or poorly secured public-facing web services for defacement and initial access
  • Use of scheduled tasks and LOLBins to execute custom wiper malware with stealth and persistence

Anticipated Targets:

  • Transportation, Communication, Energy and Water utilities in U.S. and Israel
  • Telecom, alerting systems, and national broadcast infrastructure
  • Financial platforms and digital banking services

3 – Coordinated Influence & Disinformation Campaigns

Iranian-aligned actors are likely to amplify disinformation campaigns to shape public perception, particularly around civilian impact, military failure, and geopolitical instability. These efforts often run concurrently with real-world escalations and aim to degrade public trust in institutions.

Anticipated Themes:

  • Allegations of Israeli war crimes
  • U.S. and Israeli military losses
  • Fabricated claims of successful Iranian cyber retaliation
  • Disinformation on U.S.–Israel political division
  • Leaks of manipulated or stolen documents misattributed to Israeli insiders
  • Lack of support from the U.S. populace for ongoing strikes against Iran

4 – Probing Attacks on U.S. & Israeli Infrastructure

Iran has demonstrated readiness to expand attacks to Western infrastructure during periods of high tension. Recent examples include the exploitation of Unitronics PLCs at U.S. water treatment plants (late 2023), highlighting a shift toward ICS/OT targets. Such actions serve retaliatory and signaling purposes and are often designed to be low-impact yet high-visibility to maximize psychological effect.

Anticipated Targets:

  • U.S. defense industrial base, especially contractors supporting military action
  • Israeli military and key government organizations
  • Critical infrastructure (water, energy, transportation) in the U.S. and Israel
  • Regional partners (e.g., Jordan, UAE, Egypt, Saudi Arabia) aligned with U.S. and Israeli interests
  • Media and academic institutions reporting on the conflict

SentinelOne Detection & Monitoring Posture

SentinelOne research and detection teams have closely followed Iranian cyber actors for many years. We provide multiple layers of protection and are closely monitoring emerging threat intelligence to maximize coverage.

We extensively cover techniques known to be used by Iranian threat groups including:

  • PowerShell and script abuse
  • Proxy tools
  • Credential theft
  • Keylogger components
  • Wipers
  • Browser credential theft
  • DLL sideloading
  • Tunneling tools (ngrok/Cloudflared)
  • Scheduled task persistence
  • Remote access tool abuse
  • Active Directory reconnaissance
  • Destructive boot tampering

These protections are not Iran-specific but known to be effective in detecting their operations.

We are monitoring the situation closely and can ship new detections quickly through Platform Rules updates or Live Security Updates.

For maximum protection, we recommend:

  • Turning on Live Updates
  • Ensuring you’re opted-in to Emerging Threat Platform Rules
  • Activating Platform Detection Library rules listed in Appendix A

Recommendations

  1. Increase Vigilance Against Phishing and Credential Abuse
  • Prioritize MFA enforcement and internal phishing detection
  • Monitor for abuse of VPN, email, and collaboration platforms
  • Monitor for suspicious activity involving legitimate user accounts and applications
  1. Harden Critical Infrastructure and OT Environments
  • Patch and segment exposed ICS components, especially common HMI/PLC vendors
  • Scan all Internet-facing infrastructure, and patch any vulnerable Internet-facing services
  • Consider removing or restricting network access to any non-critical Internet-facing services, especially if they are not protected by MFA
  • Review DDoS mitigation playbooks and response procedures
  1. Monitor for Influence Operations and Fake Leaks
  • Establish rapid communication response protocols for disinformation relevant to your organization
  • Be prepared for threat actors using “hacktivist” branding and Telegram/Telegram-style platforms for communication
  • Consider there are likely masquerade efforts and this requires a detailed assessment to determine true origin
  1. Review and Test Incident Response Plans
  • Ensure IR and SOC teams maintain heightened alert status
  • Simulate data-wipe and ransomware scenarios
  • Simulate corporate social media hijacking scenarios and prepare for account pausing/access resets
  1. Establish Clear Points of Contact
  • Ensure internal organization has direct POCs for support for security incidents
  • Communicate posture expectations and escalation paths internally
  1. Monitor for activity associated with Iranian state-aligned threat actors

SentinelOne is proactively hunting for IOCs and TTPs associated with these groups. These threat hunts are being performed for all Wayfinder Threat Hunting customers. Any related hunt findings will be visible in the Wayfinder Threat Hunting dashboard.

Closing Note

This report is intended to support informed decision-making and proactive defensive measures amid a dynamic and escalating geopolitical conflict.

The cyber threat landscape associated with Iranian state-aligned actors is adaptive, and we assess that both targeting priorities and tactics may shift rapidly in response to real world developments, political statements, or perceived provocations.

We advise clients to treat this as a time-sensitive assessment and to revisit posture, incident response, and monitoring processes regularly.

For immediate questions or escalations, please contact your Client Success Lead or reach our Support teams directly at: https://www.sentinelone.com/global-services/get-support-now/

Appendix

Customers should consider activating Platform Detection Library rules to improve coverage. The following rules are known to be effective against Iranian cyber operations:

MuddyWater

  • Possible MuddyWater DLL Drop Consistent with Audio Driver Sideloading

Credential Dumping

  • Suspicious Task Creation for Credential Harvesting
  • Python-Based Network Exploitation Tool
  • Potential LSASS Dumping Tools
  • Credential Dumping via Shadow Copy
  • Interactive NTDS Harvesting via VSS
  • Cached Domain Credential Dumping

Tunneling & Remote Access

  • Ngrok Domain Contacted
  • Cloudflared Persistent Tunnel Establishment Detected
  • Anomalous Process Initiating Cloudflare Tunnel Traffic

Collection & Exfiltration

  • Keylogging Script via PowerShell
  • Chromium Browser Info Stealer via Remote Debugging
  • Browser Credential and Cookie Data Access Attempt

PowerShell/Script Abuse

  • PowerShell Script Execution via Time Based Integer IPv4
  • Suspicious Usage of .NET Reflection via PowerShell
  • Encoded Powershell Launching Command Line Download

Defense Evasion, Impact, Discovery

  • Potential DLL Sideloading in PerfLogs Directory
  • Disk Data Wipe Attempt via Dd Utility
  • Boot Configuration Tampering via BCDEdit
  • BloodHound Active Directory Reconnaissance File Creation


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ClawJacked Flaw Lets Malicious Sites Hijack Local OpenClaw AI Agents via WebSocket

OpenClaw has fixed a high-severity security issue that, if successfully exploited, could have allowed a malicious website to connect to a locally running artificial intelligence (AI) agent and take over control.

"Our vulnerability lives in the core system itself – no plugins, no marketplace, no user-installed extensions – just the bare OpenClaw gateway, running exactly as documented," Oasis Security said in a report published this week.

The flaw has been codenamed ClawJacked by the cybersecurity company.

The attack assumes the following threat model: A developer has OpenClaw set up and running on their laptop, with its gateway, a local WebSocket server, bound to localhost and protected by a password. The attack kicks in when the developer lands on an attacker-controlled website through social engineering or some other means.

The infection sequence then follows the steps below -

  • Malicious JavaScript on the web page opens a WebSocket connection to localhost on the OpenClaw gateway port.
  • The script brute-forces the gateway password by taking advantage of a missing rate-limiting mechanism.
  • Post successful authentication with admin-level permissions, the script stealthily registers as a trusted device, which is auto-approved by the gateway without any user prompt.
  • The attacker gains complete control over the AI agent, allowing them to interact with it, dump configuration data, enumerate connected nodes, and read application logs.

"Any website you visit can open one to your localhost. Unlike regular HTTP requests, the browser doesn't block these cross-origin connections," Oasis Security said. "So while you're browsing any website, JavaScript running on that page can silently open a connection to your local OpenClaw gateway. The user sees nothing."

"That misplaced trust has real consequences. The gateway relaxes several security mechanisms for local connections - including silently approving new device registrations without prompting the user. Normally, when a new device connects, the user must confirm the pairing. From localhost, it's automatic."

Following responsible disclosure, OpenClaw pushed a fix in less than 24 hours with version 2026.2.25 released on February 26, 2026. Users are advised to apply the latest updates as soon as possible, periodically audit access granted to AI agents, and enforce appropriate governance controls for non-human (aka agentic) identities.

The development comes amid a broader security scrutiny of the OpenClaw ecosystem, primarily stemming from the fact that AI agents hold entrenched access to disparate systems and the authority to execute tasks across enterprise tools, leading to a significantly larger blast radius should they be compromised.

Reports from Bitsight and NeuralTrust have detailed how OpenClaw instances left connected to the internet pose an expanded attack surface, with each integrated service further broadening the blast radius and can be transformed into an attack weapon by embedding prompt injections in content (e.g., an email or a Slack message) processed by the agent to execute malicious actions.

The disclosure comes as OpenClaw also patched a log poisoning vulnerability that allowed attackers to write malicious content to log files via WebSocket requests to a publicly accessible instance on TCP port 18789.

Since the agent reads its own logs to troubleshoot certain tasks, the security loophole could be abused by a threat actor to embed indirect prompt injections, leading to unintended consequences. The issue was addressed in version 2026.2.13, which was shipped on February 14, 2026.

"If the injected text is interpreted as meaningful operational information rather than untrusted input, it could influence decisions, suggestions, or automated actions," Eye Security said. "The impact would therefore not be 'instant takeover,' but rather: manipulation of agent reasoning, influencing troubleshooting steps, potential data disclosure if the agent is guided to reveal context, and indirect misuse of connected integrations."

In recent weeks, OpenClaw has also been found susceptible to multiple vulnerabilities (CVE-2026-25593, CVE-2026-24763, CVE-2026-25157, CVE-2026-25475, CVE-2026-26319, CVE-2026-26322, CVE-2026-26329), ranging from moderate to high severity, that could result in remote code execution, command injection, server-side request forgery (SSRF), authentication bypass, and path traversal. The vulnerabilities have been addressed in OpenClaw versions 2026.1.20, 2026.1.29, 2026.2.1, 2026.2.2, and 2026.2.14.

"As AI agent frameworks become more prevalent in enterprise environments, security analysis must evolve to address both traditional vulnerabilities and AI-specific attack surfaces," Endor Labs said.

Elsewhere, new research has demonstrated that malicious skills uploaded to ClawHub, an open marketplace for downloading OpenClaw skills, are being used as conduits to deliver a new variant of Atomic Stealer, a macOS information stealer developed and rented by a cybercrime actor known as Cookie Spider.

"The infection chain begins with a normal SKILL.md that installs a prerequisite," Trend Micro said. "The skill appears harmless on the surface and was even labeled as benign on VirusTotal. OpenClaw then goes to the website, fetches the installation instructions, and proceeds with the installation if the LLM decides to follow the instructions."

The instructions hosted on the website "openclawcli.vercel[.]app" include a malicious command to download a stealer payload from an external server ("91.92.242[.]30") and run it.

Threat hunters have also flagged a new malware delivery campaign in which a threat actor by the name @liuhui1010 has been identified, leaving comments on legitimate skill listing pages, urging users to explicitly run a command they provided on the Terminal app if the skill "doesn't work on macOS."

The command is designed to retrieve Atomic Stealer from "91.92.242[.]30," an IP address previously documented by Koi Security and OpenSourceMalware for distributing the same malware via malicious skills uploaded to ClawHub.

What's more, a recent analysis of 3,505 ClawHub skills by AI security company Straiker has uncovered no less than 71 malicious ones, some of which posed as legitimate cryptocurrency tools but contained hidden functionality to redirect funds to threat actor-controlled wallets.

Two other skills, bob-p2p-beta and runware, have been attributed to a multi-layered cryptocurrency scam that employs an agent-to-agent attack chain targeting the AI agent ecosystem. The skills have been attributed to a threat actor who operates under the aliases "26medias" on ClawHub and "BobVonNeumann" on Moltbook and X.

"BobVonNeumann presents itself as an AI agent on Moltbook, a social network designed for agents to interact with each other," researchers Yash Somalkar and Dan Regalado said. "From that position, it promotes its own malicious skills directly to other agents, exploiting the trust that agents are designed to extend to each other by default. It's a supply chain attack with a social engineering layer built on top."

What bob-p2p-beta does, however, is instruct other AI agents to store Solana wallet private keys in plaintext, purchase worthless $BOB tokens on pump.fun, and route all payments through an attacker-controlled infrastructure. The second skill claims to offer a benign image generation tool to build the developer's credibility.

Given that ClawHub is becoming a new fertile ground for attackers, users are advised to audit skills before installing them, avoid providing credentials and keys unless it's essential, and monitor skill behavior.

The security risks associated with self-hosted agent runtimes like OpenClaw have also prompted Microsoft to issue an advisory, warning that unguarded deployment could pave the way for credential exposure/exfiltration, memory modification, and host compromise if the agent can be tricked into retrieving and running malicious code either through poisoned skills or prompt injections.

"Because of these characteristics, OpenClaw should be treated as untrusted code execution with persistent credentials," the Microsoft Defender Security Research Team said. "It is not appropriate to run on a standard personal or enterprise workstation."

"If an organization determines that OpenClaw must be evaluated, it should be deployed only in a fully isolated environment such as a dedicated virtual machine or separate physical system. The runtime should use dedicated, non-privileged credentials and access only non-sensitive data. Continuous monitoring and a rebuild plan should be part of the operating model."



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AI & Cloud News of the Month - Feb 2026

This episode marks the transition from The Cloudcast to The Reasoning Show, focusing more on AI and cloud topics. Brian Gracely (@bgracely) and Brandon Whichard (@bwhichard, @SoftwareDefTalk) discuss recent trends in AI, the evolution of tech teams, and the shifting landscape of enterprise AI tools.

SHOW: 1006

SHOW TRANSCRIPT: The Cloudcast #1006 Transcript

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