What’s the point of press releases from threat actors?

Welcome to this week’s edition of the Threat Source newsletter.

As a former reporter, I’ve seen my fair share of press releases. But one from a threat actor was definitely a new one for me last week.

ALPHV (aka BlackCat) publicly took credit for a massive cyber attack against MGM, a resort, gambling and sports betting company best known for its massive casinos. The attack took down slot machines, guest reservation systems, and more belonging to MGM, and the company is still feeling the effects as of Tuesday.

And despite every major news outlet reporting on the incident, the actor wanted to take messaging into its own hands and “clarify” what happened exactly. Attackers have occasionally posted updates and pseudo-press releases in the past, but this particular press release on ALPHV’s leak site (don’t worry I didn’t actually link to their site) was peak unintentional comedy to me.

For starters, the actor blamed MGM for not using their official communication channels to contact them to start negotiating a ransom payment:

“As they were not responding to our emails with the special link provided (In order to prevent other IT Personnel from reading the chats) we could not actively identify if the user in the victim chat was authorized by MGM Leadership to be present,” the statement reads.

They also said that, hypothetically, if personally identifiable information *had* been stolen, they would allow the website Have I Been Pwned? to responsibly disclose this information, even though they stopped short of saying they stole PII.

Lastly, they took a victory lap by saying several news outlets had reported false information, claimed attribution too early, or made ALPHV seem too basic of a threat actor because the tactics, techniques and procedures “used by the people they blame for the attacks are known to the public and are relatively easy for anyone to imitate.”

The entire statement reads as someone who thinks they’ve done nothing wrong, and certainly written to intimate that the situation could have gone much more smoothly had MGM just reached out to the threat actor early on through what is deemed as the appropriate channels and negotiated early.

So, it makes me wonder what ALPHV thinks they’re gaining from all this? Part of me wonders if they were upset that public reporting had connected the attack to a group called “'Scattered Spider” and they wanted to make sure everyone knew who deserved the credit. Or it could have been that they wanted to turn up the heat on MGM representatives and apply public pressure to hopefully get them to communicate and settle on a ransom payment.

It reads as if ALPHV really wants to come across as the “good guys” in this case, but I’m not sure who outside of dark web circles would be willing to feel sorry for them.

The one big thing

Talos researchers recently discovered a new malware family we’re calling “HTTPSnoop” being deployed against telecommunications providers in the Middle East. HTTPSnoop is a simple, yet effective, backdoor that consists of novel techniques to interface with Windows HTTP kernel drivers and devices to listen to incoming requests for specific HTTP(S) URLs and execute that content on the infected endpoint. We also discovered a sister implant to “HTTPSnoop” we’re naming “PipeSnoop,” which can accept arbitrary shellcode from a named pipe and execute it on the infected endpoint. All these new tools are linked to a group we’re calling “ShroudedSnooper.”

Why do I care?

This activity is a continuation of a trend we have been monitoring over the last several years in which sophisticated actors are frequently targeting the telecommunications sector. This sector was consistently a top-targeted industry vertical in 2022, according to Cisco Talos Incident Response data. However, since this is a new, relatively unknown group, we can’t be certain that they’ll only stick to targeting this particular field. The various malware at their disposal can leave a backdoor on infected machines for future attacks and malware installations and execute arbitrary shellcode on the infected endpoint.

So now what?

We found specific URL patterns that make it look like the infected system being contacted is a server hosting Microsoft’s Exchange Web Services (EWS) API. The URLs consisted of “ews” and “autodiscover” keywords over Ports 443 and 444. The blog post has a list of these patterns so potentially affected targets can scan to see if they're infected. There is also a host of detection content available for Cisco Secure products.

Top security headlines of the week

Apple released long-awaited updates to its “Lockdown Mode” with iOS 17 this week, its answer to a recent global uptick in spyware attacks. Lockdown Mode now also works on Apple Watches, in addition to iPhones and iPads, which is notable because threat actors have increasingly started targeting Apple Watches with spyware. New features also remove geolocation information from photos when Lockdown Mode is enabled and automatically block insecure Wi-Fi networks. Apple and other cellphone manufacturers are working on addressing the use of cell site simulators, also known as “stingrays.” These fake cell base stations track phone locations and spy on calls and messages after a device connects to it. Google also announced new features earlier this year that ensure their devices’ communications are always encrypted when connecting to cell towers. (TechCrunch, Electronic Frontier Foundation)

The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency announced a new program offering free security scans to public water utilities and other critical infrastructure. CISA is offering to run specialized scanners to identify a facility’s vulnerabilities and any weak configurations on internet-exposed endpoints. Then, they generate a report of any flaws or vulnerabilities found and send the plant a list of recommendations and offers for further scans to determine if the potential target has taken the appropriate steps to solve the issues. A brochure for the new program promises a “significant reduction in identified vulnerabilities in the first few months of scanning for newly enrolled water utilities.” (StateScoop, CISA)

China’s government has accused the U.S. of a campaign to infiltrate servers belonging to tech company Huawei to conduct cyber attacks and steal information, potentially as far back as 2009. China's Ministry of State Security on Wednesday outlined the accusations in a post on its WeChat account Wednesday. "In 2009, the Office of Tailored Access Operations started to infiltrate servers at Huawei's headquarters and continued conducting such surveillance operations," the post reads. China and the U.S. have continually launched accusations of spying on one another this year as tensions between the two nations rise. China also accused the U.S. National Security Agency of installing a backdoor tool that "runs secretly on thousands of network devices in many countries around the world” meant to steal data from other governments, including China and Russia. (Nikkei Asia, The Register)

Can’t get enough Talos?

• New threat actor targets Middle Eastern telcos
• How Cisco Talos IR helped a healthcare company quickly resolve a Qakbot attack
• Middle East telcos targeted by new malware with suspected nation-state backing
• APJC Monthly Talos Update

Upcoming events where you can find Talos

LABScon (Sept. 20 - 23)

Scottsdale, Arizona

Vitor Ventura gives a presentation that’s a detailed account and timeline of one such mercenary organization, from almost bankrupt to having a fully working spyware targeting iOS and Android with one-click zero-day exploit.

Grace Hopper Celebration (Sept. 26 - 29)

Orlando, Florida

Caitlin Huey, Susan Paskey and Alexis Merritt present a "Level Up Lab" titled "Don’t Fail Knowledge Checks: Accelerating Incident Response with Threat Intelligence." Participate in several fast-paced activities that emphasize the importance of threat intelligence in security incident investigations. Attendees will act as incident responders investigating a simulated incident that unfolds throughout this session. Periodic checkpoints will include discussions that highlight how incident response and threat intelligence complement each other during an active security investigation.

ATT&CKcon 4.0 (Oct. 24 - 25)

McLean, Virginia

Nicole Hoffman and James Nutland discuss the MIRE ATT&CK framework in “One Leg to Stand on: Adventures in Adversary Tracking with ATT&CK.” Even though ATT&CK has become an industry standard for cyber threat intelligence reporting, all too often, techniques are thrown at the bottoms of reports and blogs without any context never to be seen again after dissemination. This is not useful for intelligence producers or consumers. In this presentation, Nicole and James will show analysts how to use ATT&CK as a guideline for creating a contextual knowledge base for adversary tracking.

Most prevalent malware files from Talos telemetry over the past week

SHA 256: 7f66d4580871e3ee6a35c8fef6da7ab26a93ba36b80279625328aaf184435efa
MD5: e9a6b1346d1a2447cabb980f3cc5dd27
Typical Filename: профиль 10 класс.exe
Claimed Product: N/A
Detection Name: Application_Blocker

SHA 256: e4973db44081591e9bff5117946defbef6041397e56164f485cf8ec57b1d8934
MD5: 93fefc3e88ffb78abb36365fa5cf857c
Typical Filename: Wextract
Claimed Product: Internet Explorer
Detection Name: PUA.Win.Trojan.Generic::85.lp.ret.sbx.tg

SHA 256: bea312ccbc8a912d4322b45ea64d69bb3add4d818fd1eb7723260b11d76a138a
MD5: 200206279107f4a2bb1832e3fcd7d64c
Typical Filename: lsgkozfm.bat
Claimed Product: N/A
Detection Name: Win.Dropper.Scar::tpd

SHA 256: e12b6641d7e7e4da97a0ff8e1a0d4840c882569d47b8fab8fb187ac2b475636c
MD5: a087b2e6ec57b08c0d0750c60f96a74c
Typical Filename: AAct.exe
Claimed Product: N/A
Detection Name: PUA.Win.Tool.Kmsauto::1201

SHA 256: 0e2263d4f239a5c39960ffa6b6b688faa7fc3075e130fe0d4599d5b95ef20647
MD5: bbcf7a68f4164a9f5f5cb2d9f30d9790
Typical Filename: bbcf7a68f4164a9f5f5cb2d9f30d9790.vir
Claimed Product: N/A
Detection Name: Win.Dropper.Scar::1201

from Cisco Talos Blog https://bit.ly/3PqnqgD
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